

Public Perceptions Towards Liberal Values in Palestine

A survey commissioned by Friedrich Naumann Foundation – for Liberty in
cooperation with the Freedom Forum - Palestine

conducted by

Near East Consulting



Near East Consulting

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I. Introduction

Once you open the website of „Liberal International“, the international London-based organization of liberal political parties, associations and individual members of more than 50 countries in 4 continents, you will find a rich gallery of “Liberal Thinkers”. There, renowned philosophers, economists and politicians are celebrated as forerunners and creators of liberal thinking over time. You will predominantly detect personalities of European descent, born in 18th, 19th, or 20th Century, among others: Montesquieu, Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Karl Popper and John Rawls. But there are also non-Europeans to be found, among them one of the outstanding scholars of Arab tradition, Ibn Khaldun, the famous philosopher, economic and social thinker. This goes to show that Liberalism is not an idea reserved exclusively for Europeans or North-Americans, but a political concept which has a universal meaning. Individual freedom, the rule of law, an efficient market economy, a secular and democratic state: These values are important for human beings all over the world, disregarding the colour of their skin, their civilizational background or their religious tradition. Liberalism appeals to everybody.

Nevertheless, Liberalism and liberal values are not shared by everybody. Due to many different reasons, people intentionally opt for other political concepts or – which is more often the case – they reject liberal values because of a lack of information or blunt bias. For Liberals, it is crucial to understand why and to which extent people share their values. But they are even more interested to get a clue of what prevents people from approaching the values Liberals cherish so dearly. Liberals are eager to understand objections in order to tune their argumentation and reconsider their own concepts. Liberalism is a political concept created by human beings, not a religion. It is not a dogma, but changes as humankind and human experience tend to change.

We Liberals are convinced that Liberalism is able to contribute to the benefit of every human being. The citizens of Palestine are no exception in this regard. But we Liberals would like to understand better how the citizens of Palestine respond to liberal values and liberal political concepts. How do the people of Palestine relate to the liberal concept of the state, to the liberal concept of a free market, to the liberal concept of tolerance and secularism, just to name a few?

How do Palestinian citizens see their individual future and the future of their national state still in the making? Do they appreciate democracy and equal rights for minorities or do we have to face tendencies in favour of an authoritarian state with a high inclination to ignore or simply deny the rights of women, religious or ethnic minorities?

Starting from these and similar questions, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, the liberal German civic education organization commissioned an opinion poll on “Liberal Values in the Palestinian Society”. This opinion poll was carried out by “Near East Consulting”, a renowned and highly qualified research institute based in Ramallah. Thanks to the expertise and the professionalism of Jamil Rabah and his team, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty is able to present the results of our research to the citizens of Palestine and to a wider international public.

Dr. Hans-Georg Fleck
Head of Jerusalem Office
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty

II. Main findings

I. Receptiveness to liberal principles

- When asked whether they agree with civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and limited government, respondents are in the main strongly supportive; 68% express some degree of approval, and only 12% disapprove.
- In a similar vein, 96% of respondents want the state to guarantee individual rights and liberties; 75% feel that political pluralism should be guaranteed; 86% believe that all people shall have equal rights irrespective of their religion, and 95% want the state to guarantee a free and independent media

II. Facets of Palestinian identity

- Though 59% of respondents identify themselves in national or humanistic terms, religious identity strongly inflects Palestinian senses of identity; 41% said that they see themselves first as Muslims.
- The older the respondent, the less likely they are to identify themselves first and foremost as Muslims. Notably, Palestinian women are also more likely than men to identify themselves in this manner.
- Primary affiliation with an identity other than Islam does not necessarily imply that respondents are not religious. 65% see themselves as religious and only 15% say they are secularists. The population is roughly divided as to whether there is a contradiction between personal religiosity and secularism.
- 67% of the respondents said that they identify themselves more with the modernists than with the traditionalists. The same number do not see a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society

III. Religion, the individual, and society

- 84% of respondents say that religion plays a major or important role in their lives. Religion plays a lesser role for men than women, older respondents more than the younger generation, and is generally felt to be less important to the lives of respondents who trust Fateh or none of the major political parties.
- 53% of respondents feel that Islam plays a bigger role in Palestinian politics than three years ago. The main cause of religious extremism in the oPt is the Israeli occupation (19%); 16% said that there is no religious extremism. Among those who believed extremism is on the rise, only 2% felt that it was attributable to a fear of modernity.

IV. Religion and the state

- 78% of respondents would prefer to live in a state governed by religion rather than a secular state.
- When asked what should be the main source of the law, giving as options civil law, the Quran and the Sunna, and both at the same level, 51% answered either both at the same level or civil law.

- 83% of respondents totally reject the possibility of civil marriage. In contrast, 61% reject the idea that the state should enforce the Hijab. Women were actually somewhat less likely than men to do so. Although a slim majority of Hamas supporters agreed with this suggestion, a significant 44% rejected it.
- 93% of respondent agree that religious minorities should be protected. 91% of support the notion that Christians should be equal to Muslims, in all rights and obligations; 96% accepted the idea that religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools.
- However, despite broad popular support for equal rights among Christians and Muslims and support for religious and cultural tolerance, a majority of respondents would not agree with a Christian president.

V. Social liberalism

- 53% support the idea that individual freedoms may not be limited by the state, 76% of respondents are in favor of capital punishment for criminals convicted of murder,
- A slight 53% majority of respondents believe that women are discriminated against and women are slightly more likely to believe this than men. The youngest group of respondents were more likely than older ones to strongly agree with this sentiment, as were respondents affiliated with the left-leaning political parties, and with trust Fateh.
- However, to the question of whether they would agree with a woman president, 58% answered no.
- 88% of respondents also rejected the idea that women should be able to travel alone without permission from their nearest male relatives. Supporters of the left-leaning parties were least likely to totally reject this notion, though a strong majority of them (63%) nevertheless did so.

VI. Economic liberalism

- An overwhelming 95% majority believe that the government should guarantee free education for all citizens.
- A much lower 46% feel that the government should be the only social institution responsible for marginalized groups, with the largest remaining bloc of respondents feeling that such groups should be cared for by all social institutions, including religious institutions and private institutions.
- 94% of respondents also feel that the government should be more involved in social welfare; 81% believe that the government should set a minimum wage.
- In a departure from classical liberalist principles, 79% of respondents also believe that the government should be responsible for setting salaries in general, rather than letting these be determined by market forces

VII. Support for democracy

- 77% of respondents believe that democracy is good for Palestine, with responses varying very little across sub groups.

- When asked why they think democracy is good for Palestine, respondents most commonly answered that it will improve human right and personal freedoms (37%), the second most prevalent answer being that it reduces corruption.
- Respondents inclined towards Hamas were somewhat more likely than those leaning towards Fateh or other political parties to emphasize the importance of reducing corruption, rather than improving human rights and personal freedoms.
- 62% of Palestinians believe that democracy will work in Palestine.

VIII. Models for Palestine

- When asked what country they would like Palestine to be modeled after, respondents most commonly answered other Arab countries; 14% answered a European country, and 4% the United States. A full 26% said no country.
- 67% believe that Europeans are less moral than Palestinians.
- 44% felt that liberal principles could be applied whether in their entirety or in some part to all societies, including the Arab world; 32% felt that they were only applicable to the West.
- Respondents inclined to support Fateh were most likely, at 50%, to feel that liberal principles could be applied either partly or in toto to other parts of the world, whereas only 32% of those who expressed trust in Hamas said the same.
- When asked what political party today best represents liberal principles, respondents most singled out Fateh, in particular those who are themselves inclined to support that party. In general, however, a majority feels that no party represents liberal principles in the oPt.

IX. Profiling liberalism in Palestine

- Based on a composite scoring of responses to 17 sub questions, and a parsing of the population according to standard deviations from the mean score, 29% of Palestinians classify as not liberal, 27% as liberal, and 45% as in between.
- In line with findings from earlier sections, a profile of Palestinian liberals indicates that they are significantly more likely to be male rather than female, middle aged or old rather than very young, and trusting in one of the small marginal political parties, or Fateh, rather than Hamas, or in no party at all. Residents of the West Bank are also slightly more likely to be liberal than Gazans.
- Liberals were more likely than their peers to identify themselves first as a Palestinian rather than a Muslim, and twice as likely to see themselves as secularists. However, the highest share of liberals (40%) nevertheless feel that both the Quran/Sunna and Civil Law should inform the promulgation of national laws, and 38% of liberals also said that they wanted this law to be derived from religious sources

X. Attitudes to peace and coexistence

- 71% are in favor of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews, with majorities of all categories of respondents agreeing, except those supportive of Hamas, among which only 44% agree.

- Respondents are evenly divided on whether they could imagine a Jew as their neighbor in the event that all settlers were to leave Palestine; only 42% could imagine a Jew as a citizen of a Palestinian state.
- The youngest age group seems most pessimistic in this respect, with only 41% answering in the affirmative, compared to 69% of respondents older than 55.
- 56% of respondents believe that the best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through negotiations alone, while 21% believe that both negotiations and military means are necessary.
- In general, respondents classified as liberal were more likely than their peers to favor negotiations rather military means, and to give positive answers to whether they could imagine a Jew as their neighbour in a post-conflict situation characterized by an evacuation of Israeli settlers from the West Bank. They were no however more likely to imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen.

III. Methodology

A. The questionnaire

The questionnaire was drafted by NEC in close cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and in accordance with the spirit of the TOR and the mandate of the study. The questionnaire took into consideration the global and regional literature on liberalism and was constructed to capture the information required by Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Moreover, the questionnaire was constructed with special consideration to the unique characteristics of Palestinian society. As such it included questions on household structure, inter alia in order to facilitate analysis pertaining to income levels and the poverty of the respondents. After the questionnaire was drafted, it was translated and pre-tested in sixty households to check for its clarity, consistency, and cohesiveness. Only minor changes were made after pre-testing and adjustments were made accordingly.

B. Sample design

Two surveys were conducted by NEC (Near east Consulting company) using a computer interviewing, employing random digit dialling to select a random sample of households in the two occupied Palestinian regions: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The selected samples are representative of the majority of the Palestinian population in each region. Listed and unlisted residential telephones have equal probability of being included in the sample.

Regarding the selection of the respondents, emphasis was made so that the timing of the interviews will ensure the presence of all the eligible household members during the survey. Accordingly, the interviews took place between 9 am and 9 pm. The respondents represented the first person, over the age of 18, who picked up the phone first.

C. Fieldwork

The survey was carried out from the 25th of September till the 18th of October 2007. A total of 1608 (out of a total of 1900 calls) respondents were selected in both regions. The interviews were carried out by a pool of 35 experienced interviewers who were instructed beforehand about the questionnaire. The interviewers were trained on deployment of the questionnaire and on the questions that may be provided by the respondents. The response rate was relatively high for this type of survey. The refusal rate was about 16%.

D. Data cleaning and data manipulation

The data was checked and cleaned for any problems while data was entered. Some responses, such as the poverty variable and the liberty index, were constructed.

E. Weighting

Because the population sizes of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are different, and in order to examine the oPt as a single sample, NEC combined both samples into one. The combined sample was then weighted using data from PCBS regional population projections for the middle of 2007.

F. Data analysis

The data analysis was largely based on frequencies of the respective questions as well as cross tabulations with six independent variables. The data analysis for the liberalism score was performed by using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests which are statistical tools used to measure differences in means. The dependent variable in the analysis is "liberalism score", and the independent variables consisted of a number of explaining variables: Gender, age, area of residence, region of residence, factional trust, and the poverty level. These variables were also used in the analysis of all other questions.

The poverty level was based on calculating the reported household income as well as the household structure (number of dependents as well as adults). A reference family (of six household members: 2 adults and 4 children below the age of 18) was the basis for calculating the poverty level. The income of this reference family is set at 2000 NIS per month.

The liberalism score was constructed by using 17 questions related to liberalism. The answer to each question took a value from 0-10. The answer zero indicated total rejection while 10 indicated total acceptance. The liberalism score was computed for each case by summing the values of 17 questions. The liberalism score was transformed into a percentage scale by dividing the original value by 170 (The maximum value on the original scale) and multiplying by 100.


IV. Background information

The following section is intended to provide a profile of the sample's respondents: their demographic characteristics, socio-political concerns, political affiliations, and the media sources that they rely on for their information.

A. Demographic and social attributes

The sample distribution is consistent to a large extent with the demographic distribution of the oPt and the demographic characteristics of Palestinian society as a whole. As indicated below, 27% of respondents are in the 19-24 age brackets, and 23% are between 35 and 34 years old. 24% of those who are in the labour force are unemployed, 53% are either poor or extremely poor. West Bank residents make up 63% of the sample, urban dwellers 55%, and villagers 31%. Only 14% live in refugee camps, though 45% are of refugee origin.

Figure 1: Demographics



B. Optimism about the future

Despite prevailing economic hardships and political uncertainties, 67% of the respondents said that they were either optimistic or very optimistic about the future. Only 34% said that they were pessimistic. As detailed below, the level of optimism is higher among the younger generation, Hamas supporters, and respondents enjoying a relatively higher standard of

living. This high level of optimism is consistent with other recent surveys, and marks an improvement on opinion polls conducted at the height of the international donor embargo on the Palestinian Authority, and the bloody political infighting that accompanied it. The appreciable impact that short-term political developments have previously had on public sentiments in the oPt suggests that this optimism is somewhat contingent, however.

Figure 2: Level of optimism




Table 1: Optimism about the future (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp	
Very optimistic	10%	11%	10%	11%	9%	10%	11%	10%	10%	14%	11%
Optimistic	55%	60%	62%	56%	58%	50%	57%	57%	59%	55%	58%
Pessimistic	22%	21%	20%	23%	18%	29%	22%	22%	23%	18%	22%
Very pessimistic	13%	8%	8%	10%	14%	10%	10%	11%	8%	13%	10%

Table 2: Optimism about the future (According to faction, residence, and poverty)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Very optimistic	6%	17%	17%	11%	11%	11%	9%	10%
Optimistic	58%	55%	48%	57%	60%	54%	58%	58%
Pessimistic	23%	25%	22%	21%	22%	21%	24%	21%
Very pessimistic	12%	4%	13%	11%	7%	15%	9%	10%

C. Issues of concern

Among those issues that most preoccupy Palestinians, the internal conflict (41%) and the Israel occupation (24%) are in the forefront. The depth of these concerns is evident from the fact that only 6% of respondents cite employment or general lack of a good quality of life as outstanding concerns, despite 24% being unemployed and 53% living below the poverty line.

One reason for this may be that respondents believe that prevailing economic difficulties are rooted in the political situation.

Figure 3: Main issue that makes you feel concerned



The aforementioned concerns are not felt uniformly across Palestinian society. As indicated below, men are considerably more likely than women to worry about the internal conflict, as are residents of the Gaza Strip, when compared to respondents from the West Bank. The opposite holds true for concerns about the occupation. Gazans are much less concerned with it than West Bankers, though Gaza overall is more affected by external closures and has suffered a much higher death toll in the past year. One possible explanation is that the internal conflict is more marked in the Strip, to the extent that it has for the moment displaced other concerns. The occupation is also of more concern to the youngest 18-24 age cohort than to older respondents; and to villagers more than refugee camp residents and urbanites, possibly because they disproportionately suffer the consequences of closures and land confiscations. One notable feature of these responses is that they vary very little as a function of the respondents' political affiliation.

Table 3: Main issue of concern (According to gender, age, and residence)


	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Employment	6%	5%	8%	4%	5%	4%	7%	6%	6%	4%	6%
Health	3%	3%	1%	4%	3%	3%	6%	4%	2%	1%	3%
Education	5%	7%	8%	5%	6%	2%	4%	4%	9%	4%	6%
Internal Conflict	46%	37%	38%	43%	42%	46%	44%	43%	32%	58%	41%
Occupation	24%	29%	29%	26%	25%	28%	22%	27%	31%	14%	27%
General lack of good quality of life	8%	9%	4%	11%	9%	11%	5%	8%	9%	8%	8%
Personal problems	3%	6%	7%	4%	4%	3%	3%	3%	5%	7%	4%
Other reasons	5%	5%	5%	4%	7%	2%	8%	4%	7%	4%	5%

Table 4: Main issue of concern (According to faction, residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Employment	4%	3%	6%	7%	5%	6%	7%	5%
Health	3%	1%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	4%
Education	4%	4%	9%	6%	7%	3%	6%	4%
Internal Conflict	47%	50%	34%	39%	33%	55%	43%	41%
Occupation	24%	29%	22%	27%	33%	18%	22%	30%
General lack of good quality of life	8%	4%	13%	9%	8%	8%	9%	8%
Personal problems	5%	5%	6%	3%	5%	3%	4%	3%
Other reasons	4%	3%	10%	5%	6%	4%	6%	4%

D. Political affinities

Figure 4: Which political or religious faction do you trust most?



As illustrated above, a year of political infighting, culminating in the de facto partition of the Palestinian Authority has left respondents very disaffected politically, with nearly half of the population professing not to trust any of the major political parties. Among these factions, Fateh enjoys the strongest support, more than twice as much as its closest and most bitter rival Hamas, which has suffered a precipitous decline in fortune since its 2005 general election victory.

Lack of faith in any of the political parties is most pronounced among women, middle aged respondents, and refugee camp residents when compared to villages and towns. Hamas enjoys a slightly stronger following in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, but does not do better than Fateh among poor respondents. Support for Fateh does not vary significantly across age groups, but does bear some relation to place of residency, being particularly strong in refugee camps.

Table 5: Factional trust (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Fateh	38%	28%	35%	35%	31%	24%	36%	30%	32%	42%
Hamas	12%	13%	15%	10%	15%	11%	7%	13%	11%	15%
Others	9%	4%	5%	9%	5%	6%	6%	6%	5%	8%
None	42%	55%	45%	46%	50%	59%	51%	51%	52%	35%

Table 6: Factional trust (According to residence and poverty)

	Place of residence		Poverty all	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	30%	36%	33%	33%
Hamas	12%	12%	14%	12%
Others	7%	5%	4%	8%
Do not trust anyone	51%	47%	49%	46%

E. Civic involvement

As the above answers would lead one to suspect, a large share of respondents are not active in a civic or political capacity, largely irrespective of age, area or place of residence, and poverty level. As might be expected, however, men were more politically active than women. With respect to political affinity, it was also noted that among supporters of other parties but Hamas and Fateh, political activism was highest, with a full 72% claiming to be active to some extent. Respondents who trust in Fateh came second with 62%, and Hamas last with 55%. As a caveat to these findings, it should be said that in the present political environment respondents affiliated with Hamas would also be least likely to willingly divulge that they are active politically, as they might accordingly be targeted by Israeli security services.

Figure 5: Level of involvement in civic activities like volunteering, or participating in charity events?




Table 7: Level of involvement in civic activities like volunteering or participating in charity events? (According to gender, age, and residence)


	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Very active	25%	13%	18%	17%	18%	21%	23%	18%	21%	19%
Active to some extent	41%	32%	37%	40%	35%	31%	33%	36%	36%	37%
Not active	34%	55%	45%	43%	47%	47%	44%	47%	43%	44%

Table 8: Level of involvement in civic activities like volunteering or participating in charity events? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty)

	Faction				Place of residence		Poverty	
	Factional trust	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty
Very active	26%	17%	21%	14%	19%	19%	19%	21%
Active to some extent	36%	38%	51%	34%	37%	34%	35%	38%
Not active	38%	45%	28%	52%	44%	47%	46%	41%

F. Sources of information

Figure 6: Which source of information do you use most?



As indicated above, the international media, primarily Arab satellite news channels like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyya, is the main source of information for respondents. Surprisingly perhaps, the internet comes second, at 21%, and is as such a more important source of information than local TV or radio. Not surprisingly, the internet is more likely to be cited as a main source of information by respondents from the 18-24 age group rather than older peers, and by males than females. Generally, Hamas supporters are less likely to rely on the internet than Fateh supporters. In the Gaza Strip, reliance on the internet is more pronounced than in the West Bank, possibly as a result of the lack of local TV alternatives.

Table 9: Most relied on source of information (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp	
Newspapers	10%	7%	7%	10%	5%	14%	8%	8%	11%	5%	8%
Local TV	16%	23%	15%	19%	21%	22%	31%	17%	24%	22%	20%
Local radios	8%	11%	7%	8%	11%	11%	15%	10%	10%	9%	10%
Internet	26%	15%	36%	24%	12%	9%	4%	23%	14%	24%	20%
Friends/Word of mouth	5%	3%	4%	5%	5%	4%	2%	5%	4%	4%	4%
Political leaders	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Religious leaders	1%	2%	0%	1%	3%	1%	0%	1%	2%	2%	1%
International media	31%	36%	28%	31%	40%	37%	36%	34%	33%	34%	34%
Other	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	0%	4%	2%	2%	2%	2%

Table 10: Source of information you use most (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Newspapers	8%	13%	8%	7%	10%	5%	9%	9%
Local TV	17%	16%	15%	23%	21%	19%	24%	17%
Local radio	9%	11%	13%	9%	9%	11%	9%	8%
Internet	25%	16%	36%	17%	19%	23%	18%	24%
Friends/Word of mouth	3%	4%	4%	5%	4%	4%	4%	5%
Political leaders	0%	0%	3%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Religious leaders	1%	5%	0%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%
International media	35%	33%	19%	35%	33%	35%	32%	33%
Other	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%

V. *Receptiveness to liberal principles*

The following section details the degree to which Palestinians relate to and express support for general principles associated with liberalism, as a precursor to a more in-depth examination of their attitudes to specific political, social and economic issues. The responses suggest that when liberal ideology is defined in broad terms, Palestinians are strongly supportive of most aspects of it, in particularly its emphasis on individual rights, political openness, religious tolerance, and a free media, sentiments that may to a considerable extent be attributable to the suppression of such rights under Israeli occupation. Relatively speaking, Palestinians are least enthusiastic about liberalism’s emphasis on a limited economic role for government.

When asked whether they agree with liberal political principles as a package, comprising civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and limited government, respondents are in the main strongly supportive; 68% express some degree of approval, and only 12% disapprove.

Figure 7: Liberal political principles stand for civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and the limited role of the government. Do you approve or disapprove of this ideology?



As further detailed below, respondents inclined to support Hamas were somewhat less likely to agree with the majority, but even among this sub-group, a 52% majority expressed some degree of approval. Otherwise, opinions varied very little across sub groups.

Table 11: Approve or disapprove: Civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and the limited role of the government (According to gender, age, and area of residence)


	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Strongly approve	21%	18%	15%	21%	20%	27%	22%	21%	19%	16%	19%
Approve	44%	48%	50%	48%	41%	41%	46%	47%	41%	51%	46%
In between	21%	24%	24%	23%	23%	19%	18%	22%	24%	25%	23%
Disapprove	14%	11%	11%	8%	16%	13%	14%	11%	16%	8%	12%
Strongly disapprove	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 12: Approve or disapprove: Civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and the limited role of the government (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fatah	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Strongly approve	24%	10%	28%	20%	18%	22%	18%	20%
Approve	50%	42%	49%	45%	43%	49%	45%	48%
In between	18%	30%	15%	22%	25%	19%	24%	21%
Disapprove	9%	18%	8%	13%	14%	10%	12%	11%
Strongly disapprove	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


In a similar vein, respondents overwhelmingly want the state to guarantee individual rights and liberties, with a full 96% expressing some degree of acceptance of this idea.

Figure 8: The state should guarantee individual rights and liberties



A strong if slightly slimmer majority of 75% also feel that political pluralism should be guaranteed.

Figure 9: Political pluralism should be guaranteed



An even stronger majority (86%) believe that all people shall have equal rights irrespective of their religion, with only 11% of respondents rejecting this notion. As further detailed below, responses did not vary significantly across the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, nor did party affiliation greatly affect responses.

Figure 10: All people shall have equal rights irrespective of religion





Table 13: All people shall have equal rights irrespective of religion

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	7%	6%	6%	7%	7%	5%	9%	6%
Reject	4%	4%	3%	5%	4%	4%	5%	4%
Neutral	2%	4%	3%	3%	3%	6%	5%	2%
Accept	13%	15%	15%	14%	14%	16%	8%	14%
Totally accept	73%	71%	72%	72%	72%	68%	73%	74%

Similarly again, an overwhelming 95% of respondents feel that the state should guarantee a free and independent media, not surprisingly perhaps, given that the Palestinian experience under Israeli occupation has to a great extent been defined by a persistent denial of free speech. As previously, this sentiment holds strong across the political spectrum, in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and is shared by poor respondents, as well those who are better off.

Figure 11: The state should guarantee a free and independent media




The strength of this sentiment is particularly notable given that local newspapers and TV stations in the West Bank and Gaza have traditionally enjoyed strong relationships to political parties. By example, the three main Palestinian newspaper dailies, Al Quds, Al Ayyam, and al-Hayat al-Jadida have ties to the long-ruling Fateh party, whereas their main competitor in areas like the Gaza Strip, Al-Risala, is linked to the Islamist movement. However, outright censorship of the media has been markedly less pronounced under the Palestinian Authority than among neighbouring Arab countries.

Table 14: Guaranteeing free and independent media

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	3%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	2%
Reject	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%
Neutral	3%	3%	4%	3%	1%	6%	2%	4%
Accept	14%	14%	12%	15%	12%	19%	9%	14%
Totally accept	80%	81%	82%	78%	83%	73%	84%	79%

As alluded to earlier, respondents were least enthusiastic, relatively speaking, about the idea that state interference in the economy should be limited. While they were somewhat more like to accept this notion (45%) than they were to reject it (42%), there was no majority in support of it, and responses did not vary significantly across sub groups.

Figure 12: State interference in the economy should be limited




In context, it may be noted that a significant number of respondents are likely to rely on salaries paid by the Palestinian Authority, which has served since its inception as a de facto employment generating mechanism in order to alleviate the worst impositions of Israeli closures. These closures have since not only crippled the local economy but also substantively eroded the underlying basis for a “free market” in the oPt. As long as the Israeli occupation endures, therefore, many Palestinians are likely to be apprehensive of a reduced role for the Palestinian proto- state. Palestinian attitudes to the state’s role vis-à-vis the economy will be parsed in further detail later in this report.

Table 15: State interference in the economy should be limited (According to residence, poverty level and faction)

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	27%	28%	28%	27%	29%	23%	23%	26%
Reject	14%	16%	14%	15%	14%	15%	15%	15%
Neutral	14%	12%	14%	13%	12%	18%	18%	14%
Accept	17%	21%	19%	18%	18%	17%	12%	19%
Totally accept	29%	22%	24%	27%	27%	27%	32%	26%

When asked to identify their governance priorities, respondents expressed most support for social justice and law and order, followed by rule of law and tolerance. Religiosity was the least important priority, both in terms of the number of people who feel it is important to some degree, as well as those who feel that it is very important.

Figure 13: Perceptions about the importance of some aspects of social and judicial beliefs



In light of the respondents' strong support for rule of law, it is also not surprising that an overwhelming 97% majority feel that state corruption is a danger to democracy and the rule of law, with responses varying very little across any sub group, as further detailed below.

Figure 14: State corruption is a danger to democracy and the rule of law




Table 16: State corruption is a danger to democracy and the rule of law (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Strongly agree	70%	66%	64%	66%	67%	73%	76%	69%	67%	62%	68%
Agree	26%	31%	31%	31%	31%	25%	19%	28%	29%	36%	29%
Disagree	3%	2%	4%	2%	2%	2%	5%	2%	4%	2%	3%
Strongly disagree	1%	1%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%


Table 17: State corruption is a danger to democracy and the rule of law (According to faction place of residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Strongly agree	68%	67%	75%	67%	70%	63%	66%	71%
Agree	29%	31%	24%	29%	27%	33%	30%	27%
Disagree	2%	2%	1%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%
Strongly disagree	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

VI. Facets of Palestinian identity

The following sections of the report seek to examine in more detail certain aspects of Palestinian belief systems, and their attitudes to specific social, economic and political issues that may speak to their support for liberal principles. To provide a contextual backdrop for this examination, this section examines how Palestinians identify themselves as individuals, whether in term of religious identity, national identity, or broader affiliations. It also seeks to investigate their attitudes to secularism and its compatibility with personal religiosity, as well the degree to which they generally see themselves as “modernists,” or “traditionalists.”

Though a slim majority of respondents identify themselves in national or humanistic terms, religion and Islam in particular strongly inflects Palestinian senses of identity, as illustrated below. 41% said that they see themselves first as Muslim; while 29% said that they identify themselves as a Palestinians. 23% identified themselves as human beings.



Not surprisingly, followers of the Islamic movement Hamas are considerably more likely than their Fateh counterparts to identify themselves foremost as Muslims, though this group was also the only sub category of respondents wherein a majority expressed such sentiments. Compared to Arab nationalism, political Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Middle East, dating its ascendancy to the 1980's, and as such it is also not surprising that the older the respondent, the less likely they are to identify themselves first and foremost as Muslims. Notably, Palestinian women are also more likely than men to identify themselves in this manner.

Table 18: How do you identify yourself? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
A Palestinian first	36%	18%	41%	28%	28%	31%	30%	28%
A Muslim first	33%	58%	26%	42%	43%	40%	43%	40%
An Arab first	6%	2%	8%	5%	6%	5%	5%	6%
A human being first	25%	22%	24%	24%	22%	24%	22%	25%
Other	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 19: Identification (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
A Palestinian first	33%	25%	28%	29%	25%	28%	35%	28%	30%	32%	29%
A Muslim first	38%	45%	44%	40%	45%	37%	35%	42%	42%	36%	42%
An Arab first	7%	4%	5%	3%	4%	8%	10%	5%	6%	4%	5%
A human being first	20%	26%	22%	27%	23%	25%	19%	24%	21%	28%	23%
Other	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%

As shown below, however, primary affiliation with an identity other than Islam does not necessarily imply that respondents are not religious. In fact, when asked whether they see themselves as religious or secularist, 63% of the respondents said that former and only 15% said the latter.

Figure 16: Do you personally identify your self as a secularist or as a religious person?



Once again, 85% of those trusting Hamas said that they are religious while only 48% of Fateh respondents said so. Also, women were more likely than men to express such sentiments, as were younger respondents, and those living below the poverty line.

Table 20: Do you identify yourself as a secularist or a religious person? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
A secularist	21%	11%	14%	18%	17%	14%	14%	17%	16%	10%	16%
A religious person	56%	68%	66%	59%	60%	65%	60%	62%	61%	66%	62%
Both together	23%	22%	20%	23%	23%	21%	26%	21%	24%	24%	22%

Table 21: Do you identify yourself as a secularist or a religious person? (According to faction, residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
A secularist	25%	6%	31%	12%	19%	10%	13%	20%
A religious person	48%	85%	48%	64%	60%	67%	67%	59%
Both together	27%	9%	20%	24%	21%	23%	20%	21%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In light of the above findings, it is interesting to note that the population is much more divided as to whether there is a contradiction between personal religiosity and secularism, with roughly half of respondents falling on either side of this proposition. In strictly political terms, secularism - as understood in most western societies - does not of course negate the existence or even prevalence of religious beliefs among the general population, but signifies a separation between such beliefs and the manner in which a society is governed. As further detailed below, the only sub group within the population which diverged from this general response pattern were supporters of Hamas, only 30% of whom felt that personal religiosity and secularism were compatible.

Figure 17: It is possible for an individual to be a secularist yet also be religious?




Table 22: Agree or disagree: Is it possible for an individual to be a secularist yet being religious? (According to gender, age, and residence)


	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Strongly approve	15%	13%	12%	14%	12%	24%	12%	14%	14%	15%	14%
Approve	32%	37%	32%	33%	37%	32%	44%	36%	33%	33%	35%
Disapprove	27%	28%	28%	32%	25%	24%	26%	28%	29%	22%	27%
Strongly disapprove	27%	22%	29%	21%	26%	20%	18%	22%	25%	29%	24%

Table 23: Is it possible for an individual to be a secularist yet being religious? (According to faction, residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Strongly approve	16%	5%	13%	16%	13%	16%	11%	15%
Approve	40%	25%	42%	34%	33%	37%	38%	31%
Disapprove	24%	35%	24%	27%	30%	21%	25%	31%
Strongly disapprove	19%	35%	21%	23%	23%	26%	25%	23%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Although the vast majority of Palestinians see themselves as religious, a majority, nonetheless, also regards themselves as modernists rather than as traditionalists. As indicated below, 67% of the respondents said that they identify themselves more with the modernists than with the traditionalists; only 16% said the opposite.

Figure 18: Do you identify your self with the modernists or the traditionalists



These results are rather consistent across all sectors of Palestinian society irrespective of gender, factional trust, or age, as shown below. The results are also not surprising. Social progressivism and even avant-gardism – particularly as defined in relation to the rest of the Arab world - has historically been a staple of secular Palestinian nationalism. On the other side of the political spectrum, the Islamist movement also sees itself in many respects as a movement of change, rejecting Arab statism, as well as local religious traditions that it regards as insufficiently Islamic. The Islamists' understanding of the sources of religious authority in the modern world and the role that Islam should play in politics also diverges in many noted respects from Middle East tradition, this tradition being exemplified by the accommodating relationship that has prevailed between theological authorities and Middle Eastern states in both the 19th and 20th centuries. If anything therefore, responses to this question suggest that distinctions such as tradition and modernity may not be very useful to a socio-political analysis of the oPt, or indeed other Middle Eastern societies.

Table 24: Do you identify yourself as a modernist or a traditionalist? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
With the modernists	65%	67%	74%	68%	66%	61%	53%	68%	63%	70%	66%
With the traditionalists	17%	14%	14%	15%	14%	15%	24%	14%	18%	18%	16%
Neither	17%	19%	12%	16%	20%	24%	23%	18%	19%	13%	18%

Table 25: Do you identify yourself as a modernist or a traditionalist? (According to faction, residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
With the modernists	72%	64%	64%	66%	65%	69%	66%	69%
With the traditionalists	14%	16%	20%	16%	16%	15%	16%	13%
Neither	13%	20%	16%	18%	19%	16%	18%	18%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In further support of the above explanation, it may be noted that a strong 67% majority of respondents do not see a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. Parsing responses by sub groups, the only notable if still relatively slight deviation from this response pattern was evidenced among respondents who support neither of the main political factions, a large number of whom are adherents of left wing Marxist factions, as well as the far right Islamic Jihad. Still, even among this sub group only a 37% majority supported the proposition and it may be noted that the Marxist groups have historically not been overtly anti-religious in their politics, but rather expressed their ideology in terms of secularism and progressive social change.

Figure 19: Some say that there is a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, do you approve or disapprove with this statement?




Table 26: Is there a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society? (According to faction, residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Strongly approve	11%	9%	7%	11%	10%	11%	10%	11%
Approve	23%	17%	30%	24%	21%	26%	23%	22%
Disapprove	33%	35%	25%	33%	35%	26%	35%	33%
Strongly disapprove	33%	39%	38%	32%	33%	36%	32%	35%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Table 27: Is there a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village		Camp
Strongly approve	10%	11%	8%	11%	10%	14%	13%	10%	11%	13%	11%
Approve	23%	23%	27%	20%	25%	20%	20%	23%	24%	25%	23%
Disapprove	30%	33%	32%	37%	28%	31%	32%	30%	37%	31%	32%
Strongly disapprove	37%	32%	33%	31%	37%	34%	35%	38%	28%	32%	34%

VII. Religion, the individual, and society

With a particular reference to the importance of religion and religious identity to contemporary Palestinian society, the following chapter examines a number of aspects of both personal and social religiosity.

Figure 20: Are you religious more in belief, in practice, or in both equally?



While 63% of Palestinians identify themselves as being religious, a slightly lower number, 58% feel that they are religious both in belief and in practice, with 23% saying that they are more religious in belief, as shown above. The level of belief is strong across all sectors of society, though respondents trusting Hamas were slightly more likely than those trusting Fateh to say that they are more religious in practice than in belief, while also being more likely to feel that they were equally religious in both terms. As previously observed, women felt that they were more devout than men, e.g. that their practical adherence to their religion was consummate with their belief. Otherwise few notable variances were observed across different respondent categories.

Table 28: Are you religious more in belief, in practice, or in both equally? (According to faction, residence, and poverty)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
More in belief than practice	28%	23%	26%	22%	26%	20%	22%	25%
More in practice than in belief	11%	16%	15%	10%	11%	10%	10%	14%
Both equally	48%	59%	40%	61%	53%	62%	60%	51%
Neither	13%	2%	19%	7%	10%	8%	9%	10%

Table 29: Are you religious more in belief, in practice, or in both equally? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village		Camp
More in belief than practice	24%	23%	28%	29%	18%	20%	24%	22%	25%	27%	24%
More in practice than in belief	12%	10%	11%	10%	12%	11%	12%	12%	11%	7%	11%
Both equally	49%	63%	53%	51%	60%	62%	61%	57%	54%	60%	56%
Neither	14%	4%	9%	10%	10%	7%	4%	9%	10%	6%	9%

Given the respondents' strong identification with Islam and religion, it is not surprising that 84% of them say that religion plays a major or important role in their lives. Only 16% of the respondents said that religion plays a minor role.

Figure 21: What is the role/impact of religion on your personal life?



As further detailed below, religion impacts men less than women, older respondents more than the younger generation, and is generally felt to be less important to the lives of respondents who trust Fateh or none of the major political parties. For example, whereas 23% of Fateh respondents said that religion has a minor impact on their lives, the percentage does not exceed 6% among supporters of Hamas. In general, however, differences in opinion with respect to this question were relatively minor.

Table 30: The role or impact of religion on your personal life (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Plays a major role	45%	56%	49%	50%	53%	56%	53%	52%	50%	51%	51%
Plays an important role	32%	33%	31%	36%	34%	27%	26%	31%	32%	36%	32%
Has a small impact	14%	7%	14%	9%	7%	10%	12%	10%	12%	10%	11%
Has no impact whatsoever	9%	4%	6%	4%	5%	7%	9%	6%	6%	3%	6%

Table 31: The role or impact of religion on your personal life? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Plays a major role	44%	65%	37%	52%	49%	54%	53%	51%
Plays an important role	35%	28%	36%	33%	33%	31%	31%	33%
Has a small impact	12%	3%	19%	11%	11%	9%	11%	11%
Has no impact whatsoever	9%	3%	8%	5%	6%	5%	5%	5%

Whereas 84% of the respondents said that religion plays a major role in their lives, the percentage drops to 66% when they were asked about the extent to which it plays a role in their community. Responses hardly varied across sub groups.

Figure 22: The extent to which religion plays a role in your community?




Table 32: The extent that religion plays in the community that you live in (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp	
Plays a major role	29%	27%	25%	24%	29%	32%	33%	29%	27%	23%	28%
Plays an important role	36%	38%	34%	40%	39%	37%	37%	37%	34%	48%	37%
Has some role	28%	28%	33%	27%	27%	25%	22%	27%	32%	23%	28%
Has no role	8%	7%	7%	9%	6%	6%	8%	7%	7%	5%	7%

Table 33: The extent that religion plays in the community that you live in? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Plays a major role	23%	30%	25%	27%	28%	28%	28%	26%
Plays an important role	38%	36%	44%	36%	35%	41%	37%	38%
Has some role	31%	29%	23%	28%	30%	24%	29%	30%
Has no role whatsoever	7%	5%	8%	8%	8%	6%	6%	6%

As illustrated below, 53% of respondents feel that Islam plays a bigger role in Palestinian politics than three years ago. While most categories of respondents answered in line with this general trend, it is notable that respondents from the youngest, 18-24 age group were least likely to agree (40%), whereas those from the oldest, 55 and over age group were most likely to do so (60%). As noted earlier, younger respondents are more likely to identify themselves as Muslims first and foremost, whereas those from the oldest age group were least likely to do so. One explanation for this slight divergence may therefore be that the younger generation is less likely, given their own, more marked sense of religiosity, to notice if a more pervasive religiosity infuses political rhetoric and praxis.

Figure 23: Would you say that...




Table 34: Would you say that...? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	Total
Islam plays bigger role in Palestinian politics than 3 yrs ago	54%	51%	46%	50%	57%	56%	60%	54%	49%	53%	52%
Plays about the same role as three years ago	21%	24%	24%	21%	21%	25%	25%	22%	25%	21%	22%
Plays a lesser role than three years ago	25%	25%	31%	29%	22%	19%	14%	24%	26%	26%	25%


Table 35: Would you say that...? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Islam plays bigger role in Palestinian politics than 3yrs ago	51%	59%	58%	51%	49%	58%	53%	52%
Plays about the same role as three years ago	21%	22%	20%	25%	24%	21%	22%	24%
Plays a lesser role than three years ago	28%	19%	22%	23%	27%	22%	25%	24%

When asked what they thought was the main cause of religious extremism in the oPt, respondents gave a wide range of answers. The most common response was the Israeli occupation (19%), followed by the reply that there is no religious extremism in the oPt. Among those who believed that religious extremism was on the rise, only 2% felt that it was attributable to a fear of modernity, an explanation which is otherwise widely cited in the western media. This is not surprising, in light of the respondents' answers to previous questions about the compatibility of Islam and modernity, and their own self-image as

modernists. Poverty and unemployment, which is also a common explanatory variable according to many Western analyses, was cited as a main reason by 10% of respondents. A relatively higher 14% cited low education, possibly suggesting that they felt religious extremists have been poorly educated in the real tenets of their religion. Also of note, a significant 14% cited western enmity towards Islam.

Figure 24: In your opinion, what is the main cause behind religious extremism in the oPt?



Surprisingly perhaps, respondents who felt that there is no religious extremism in the oPt were not significantly more likely to be adherents of Hamas than Fateh, or any of the other political parties. The latter category was however more likely than the general population to feel that that Israeli occupation was to blame (29%). Further to our findings from the previous question, it was also notable that very young respondents were much less likely (13%) to feel that religious extremism was a problem in the oPt, when compared to very old respondents (22%). Again, the explanation may be that younger Palestinians are themselves more religious than older generations, particularly those reared on Arab socialism, and are as such more likely to feel that religious politics are normal.

Table 36: Main cause of religious extremism in the oPt (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp	
Poverty and unemployment	9%	10%	8%	11%	10%	8%	9%	10%	10%	7%	10%
Fear of modernity	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Influence of religious leaders	10%	9%	10%	10%	8%	9%	11%	11%	5%	10%	9%
Israeli occupation	20%	19%	19%	21%	19%	15%	23%	20%	21%	13%	19%
The enmity the West has towards Islam	14%	15%	15%	11%	16%	15%	14%	14%	15%	13%	14%
Low education	14%	13%	15%	15%	15%	16%	9%	14%	11%	19%	14%
Moral decadence	5%	6%	8%	4%	6%	4%	3%	6%	5%	7%	6%
Corruption	10%	11%	9%	11%	9%	15%	8%	9%	13%	10%	11%
There is no religious extremism	15%	15%	13%	15%	13%	16%	22%	13%	17%	18%	15%

Table 37: Main cause of religious extremism in the oPt (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Poverty and unemployment	10%	8%	11%	9%	10%	9%	10%	10%
Fear of modernity	3%	0%	4%	2%	3%	2%	2%	3%
Influence of religious leaders	11%	8%	8%	9%	8%	11%	11%	8%
Israeli occupation	20%	18%	29%	18%	21%	17%	19%	19%
The enmity the West has towards Islam	10%	19%	9%	17%	17%	10%	13%	17%
Low education	16%	10%	7%	14%	13%	16%	12%	17%
Moral decadence	4%	9%	1%	6%	5%	6%	6%	4%
Corruption	12%	13%	10%	9%	11%	10%	11%	9%
There is no religious extremism	14%	15%	19%	16%	13%	18%	16%	13%

VIII. Religion and the state

Having explored in some length the role of religion in defining the identity and daily lives of Palestinians in the oPt, the report now examines the extent to which they feel that religion should guide their government and laws. As discussed below, attitudes in this regard diverge markedly in some respects from those most commonly associated with western liberalism, while also agreeing with it in other regards.

In light of their responses to previous questions, it is not surprising to note, as shown below, that a strong 78% majority of respondents would prefer to live in a state governed by religion rather than a secular state.

Figure 25: Do you prefer to live in a secular state or in a state governed by religion?



Consistent with trends observed earlier, women were more inclined than men to give this answer, though there was less marked variation across age groups. Respondents living below the poverty line were also slightly more inclined to favour a state governed by religion than those who are better off. Not surprisingly, a full 95% of Hamas supporters agreed, though a 65% majority of respondents inclined towards Fateh also said the same. The lowest level of support for a religious state (58%) was voiced by respondents inclined towards other parties, which primarily include small, left-wing factions.

Table 38: Do you prefer to live in a secular state or in a state governed by religion? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	Total
A secular state	30%	17%	20%	25%	24%	26%	23%	26%	19%	21%	23%
A state governed by religion	70%	83%	80%	75%	76%	74%	77%	74%	81%	79%	77%

Table 39: Do you prefer to live in a secular state or in a state governed by religion? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
A secular state	35%	5%	47%	20%	25%	20%	19%	27%
A state governed by religion	65%	95%	53%	80%	75%	80%	81%	73%

One potential problem with the above question is that it may force respondents to draw a distinction between secularism and religiosity which may not be self-evident to many of them. As noted earlier, a full 50% of respondents feel that it is possible to be a secularists as well as a religious person, though only a minority of them place themselves in the former category. In general, it is commonly observed that political language and laws in even self-professedly secular and liberal western states like the United States and Germany are often strongly inflected by Christian values, as exemplified in particular by US debates and legislation concerning abortion and homosexual marriage.

In the Palestinian case, there is further evidence of how muddled this terrain may be. In response to two questions which inquired separately whether religion should be the source of all law, or whether the people should be the source of all law, an overwhelming 82% of respondents said religion, yet a very strong 70% also said the people. Naturally, if most people feel themselves to be religious, and believe that religion plays a major role in their society, the ostensible contradiction between these two positions is somewhat mooted.

Figure 26: Religion is the source of all laws





Figure 27: People are the source of all laws



Examining such attitudes from a slightly different angle, the survey also asked what should be the main source of the law, giving as options Civil Law, the Quran and the Sunna, and Both of These at the Same Level. As illustrated below, a slight 51% majority answered either Both at the Same Level or Civil Law, with the very sizeable remainder answering the Quran and the Sunna. In line with earlier observed trends, that portion of the population favouring the Quran and Sunna alone is more likely to be composed of women than men; very young people rather than those over 55 years of age; and poor, rather than better-off respondents. It is also more likely to include villagers rather than urban or refugee camp residents. Not surprisingly,

respondents inclined towards Hamas were more than twice as likely (71%) as those leaning towards Fateh (36%) to give this answer.

Figure 28: What in your opinion should be the main source of the law?





Table 40: Main source of the law (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Civil law	18%	9%	11%	11%	14%	15%	19%	15%	9%	14%	13%
The Quran and the Sunna	45%	52%	53%	47%	48%	50%	42%	45%	56%	48%	49%
Both at the same level	37%	39%	36%	41%	38%	36%	39%	40%	35%	39%	38%

Table 41: Main source of the law (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Civil law	19%	4%	26%	12%	14%	10%	11%	17%
The Quran and the Sunna	36%	71%	44%	51%	51%	46%	53%	45%
Both at the same level	44%	25%	29%	37%	35%	44%	36%	38%

Figure 29: Civil marriage should be allowed



Some indication of the limits that Palestinian place on state-driven religiosity is offered by answers to the questions of whether civil marriage should be allowed and whether the state should enforce the Hijab? As shown above, 83% of respondents totally reject the possibility of civil marriage. In contrast, they were much less supportive of the state enforcing the Hijab, as illustrated below; 61% rejected the idea, though a significant 31% also accepted it.

Figure 30: The Hijab should be enforced by the state



As shown below, women were actually somewhat more likely than men to accept that the state should enforce the Hijab. It was also notable that although a slim majority of Hamas supporters agreed with this suggestion, a significant 44% rejected it. By comparison, 69% of Fateh supporters rejected it. Theologically speaking, it may be noted that there is a current of argument within Islam which holds that matters of religious observance should remain a matter of individual choice, even if they are required under religious law.

Table 42: The Hijab should be enforced by the state (According to gender)


		Gender.	
		Male	Female
Do you accept that the state should enforce the Hijab	Totally reject	54%	48%
	Reject	10%	9%
	Neutral	9%	6%
	Accept	8%	9%
	Totally accept	20%	27%

Table 43: The Hijab should be enforced by the state (According to place of residence, poverty level and faction)

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	50%	53%	49%	53%	60%	35%	55%	51%
Reject	9%	11%	9%	10%	9%	9%	8%	9%
Neutral	7%	8%	7%	9%	8%	5%	8%	7%
Accept	8%	8%	8%	10%	7%	10%	3%	9%
Totally accept	26%	20%	28%	18%	16%	41%	25%	24%

In general, respondents drew a comparably strong link between religious governance on the one hand, and personal freedoms and human rights on the other. 60% felt that such rights would increase under a religious state, whereas only 34% thought that they would decrease. The responses are consistent with the respondents' religiosity, as identified by previous questions, and likely accord with the understanding that violence and abuses of power would be curtailed in a state was guided by religious principles.

Figure 31: Under a religious state personal freedom and human rights will increase, decrease, or remain the same?



As shown below, answers did not vary significantly as a function of gender, age or area of residence. Not surprisingly, however, Hamas supporters were more likely than respondents inclined towards other parties, including Fateh, to feel that freedoms and rights would increase, as were poor respondents, when compared to better-off ones.

Table 44: Under a religious state personal freedom and human rights will increase, decrease or remain the same? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	Total
Definitely increase	28%	27%	32%	26%	25%	28%	29%	27%	30%	25%	28%
Will increase	31%	34%	34%	32%	32%	32%	33%	31%	35%	35%	33%
Will decrease	22%	23%	20%	26%	24%	20%	19%	24%	20%	25%	22%
Definitely decrease	15%	10%	11%	12%	14%	15%	12%	14%	11%	10%	13%
Remain the same	4%	5%	4%	4%	5%	5%	7%	4%	4%	5%	5%

Table 45: Under a religious state personal freedom and human rights will increase, decrease or remain the same? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Will definitely increase	19%	38%	25%	30%	28%	27%	28%	29%
Will increase	29%	36%	29%	35%	32%	34%	36%	28%
Will decrease	29%	16%	25%	21%	24%	20%	21%	25%
Will definitely decrease	20%	7%	19%	9%	13%	12%	11%	13%

Historically the Palestinian national movement has placed a strong rhetorical emphasis on unity among Palestinians of different religion. A number of Palestinian towns and villages are historically mixed by confession. In light of the fact that the dominant Islamic religion in the oPt also contains provisions for the protection or religious minorities, it is therefore not surprising that an overwhelming 93% of respondent agree that religious minorities should be protected. As further detailed below, there is near identical agreement on this issue among respondents affiliated with the various political factions, regardless of their place or residence or poverty level.

Figure 32: Religious minorities should be protected




Table 46: Religious minorities should be protected

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	3%	1%	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%	3%
Reject	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%
Neutral	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	5%	2%	2%
Accept	15%	16%	15%	15%	16%	16%	14%	16%
Totally accept	77%	77%	76%	77%	77%	76%	79%	77%

In the same vein, 91% of respondents support the notion that Christians should be equal to Muslims, in all rights and obligations, despite the fact that this principle is not strictly enshrined in Islamic law. This position again holds constant across all sub categories.

Figure 33: Do you support or oppose that Christians be equal to Muslims in all rights and obligations





Table 47: Support or oppose Christians being equal to Muslims in all rights and obligations (According to faction, residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Support	92%	89%	88%	90%	90%	91%	91%	92%
Oppose	8%	11%	12%	10%	10%	9%	9%	8%


In a similar vein, 96% of respondents accepted the idea that religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools.

Figure 34: Religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools



However, despite broad popular support for equal rights among Christians and Muslims and support for religious and cultural tolerance, a majority of respondents would not agree with a Christian president. It is unclear from the question whether this means that respondents would not vote for a Christian president, or whether they are opposed to the idea as a constitutional principle. Clearly, even the former possibility does not speak to a liberal attitude towards religious diversity among Palestinians. However, it does not necessarily mean that Palestinians are in this respect different from a number of western democracies, wherein the highest office of state is rarely if ever won or even contested by members of religious minorities such as Jews, even in countries like the United States and the UK, where they have a long established presence, and are otherwise well-integrated.

Figure 35: Would you agree or disagree with the following: a Christian president?



Opposition to a Christian president is strongest among women, younger respondents, and villages and camps, as opposed to urban areas. It may also be noted that although a full 79% of Hamas supporters oppose a Christian president, a 69% of Fateh supporters also do so.

Table 48: Agree or disagree: a Christian president. (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Yes	42%	27%	24%	34%	35%	45%	44%	39%	29%	28%	34%
No	58%	73%	76%	66%	65%	55%	56%	61%	71%	72%	66%


Table 49: Agree or disagree: a Christian president (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	38%	21%	50%	33%	36%	30%	30%	39%
No	62%	79%	50%	67%	64%	70%	70%	61%

IX. Social liberalism

As discussed earlier in the report, Palestinians are generally very supportive of the state guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms, as a matter of broad principle. The following section explores more specific attitudes to issues of social equality and rights, broadly falling under the category of social liberalism, and with a particular emphasis on the rights of women.

Figure 36: Individual freedoms may not be limited by the state



As shown above, there is slight majority (53%) support among Palestinians for the idea that individual freedoms may not be limited by the state; a full 34% reject this notion, and a further 13% are neutral on the issue. To some degree, this ambiguity may be expected. Like most religious belief systems, Christianity and Islam impose certain limits on individual freedoms, and Levantine Arab society traditionally places a high value on collective social responsibility. As detailed below, the main sub groups within the sample did not differ markedly in their responses to this question.


Table 50: Individual freedoms may not be limited by the state (According to place of residence, poverty level, and faction)

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza S	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	23%	23%	24%	21%	22%	19%	18%	25%
Reject	11%	12%	12%	11%	9%	11%	21%	11%
Neutral	12%	13%	11%	16%	11%	17%	6%	14%
Accept	16%	22%	18%	19%	21%	20%	11%	18%
Totally accept	37%	31%	34%	33%	37%	33%	44%	33%

The consumption of alcohol is prohibited under Islam, though alcohol is widely and legally sold in Palestinian cities and villages with a historic Christian population, and also consumed by a certain portion of secularized Muslims. In so far as alcohol sales are only licensed in traditionally Christian areas, there are de facto restrictions on its sale. As shown, below, 72% of respondents likely agree with this policy, this being the portion of the sample who feel that selling alcohol to adults should not be a private issue. In so far as alcohol is considered a particularly corrosive vice within Muslim society, this should not be surprising, and in that regard the responses may be more or less in line with the approach most western societies take towards the sale of drugs like marijuana. It is not possible to ascertain whether the responses would have been different if a caveat was added; noting that it only pertained to the sale of alcohol within the Christian community. Regardless, however, a strong majority of

respondents likely feel that regardless of who the seller or consumer is, selling alcohol does not constitute a personal freedom, or is a freedom that should be proscribed by the state.

Figure 37: Selling alcohol to adults should be a private issue



Though a significant 24% of respondents are opposed to capital punishment even in the case of criminals convicted of murder, it is clear that a majority of respondents (66%) feel otherwise, with little variation across sub groups.

Figure 38: People convicted of murder should not face capital punishment




Table 51: People convicted of murder should not face capital punishment (According to place of residence, poverty level, and faction)

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	52%	62%	59%	51%	53%	66%	47%	56%
Reject	8%	10%	8%	9%	11%	5%	8%	8%
Neutral	10%	9%	10%	10%	9%	10%	8%	10%
Accept	8%	7%	6%	10%	9%	4%	11%	7%
Totally accept	22%	13%	18%	20%	18%	15%	25%	18%

As shown below, a slight 53% majority of respondents believe that women are discriminated against in Palestine; women are slightly more likely to believe this than men. Furthermore, the youngest group of respondents are more likely than older ones to strongly agree with this sentiment, as are respondents affiliated with the left-leaning political parties, and those who are inclined to trust Fateh. Supporters of Hamas are less likely than the general population to agree.

Figure 39: Women are discriminated against in Palestine?




Table 52: Women are discriminated against in Palestine (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village		Camp
Strongly agree	17%	21%	23%	17%	19%	15%	12%	19%	19%	18%	6%
Agree	33%	34%	33%	39%	36%	28%	32%	35%	30%	40%	22%
Disagree	30%	27%	30%	30%	27%	29%	27%	25%	35%	27%	25%
Strongly disagree	21%	18%	14%	14%	18%	28%	30%	21%	17%	15%	47%

Table 53: Women are discriminated against in Palestine (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Strongly agree	20%	13%	28%	19%	18%	19%	17%	18%
Agree	36%	28%	47%	32%	33%	34%	37%	32%
Disagree	25%	35%	15%	31%	29%	27%	28%	29%
Strongly disagree	19%	24%	11%	18%	19%	19%	18%	20%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A strong majority of respondents are also supportive of democracy even if it ensures that that women shall be equal to men at all levels, with 48% answering yes to this question, and 28% probably yes. This is despite the fact that there are aspects of Islamic scripture, which may be construed as placing women at an unequal level with respect to men, for instance in matters of legal testimony. As such, it may be noted that supporters of Hamas were somewhat less

likely than the general population to answer definitely yes to this question, and somewhat more likely to say definitely no. Overall, however, 68% of such respondents still answered yes, to some degree or another.

Figure 40: Democracy says that women shall be equal to men in all levels, would you support democracy then?




Table 54: Would you support democracy if it says that women shall be equal to men in all levels? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Definitely yes	44%	50%	48%	51%	44%	52%	39%	49%	43%	49%	47%
Probably yes	30%	27%	28%	25%	29%	31%	34%	28%	30%	27%	28%
Probably no	10%	10%	11%	10%	11%	6%	11%	9%	12%	10%	10%
Definitely no	16%	13%	13%	14%	16%	11%	16%	13%	15%	15%	14%

Table 55: Would you support democracy if it says that women shall be equal to men in all levels? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Definitely yes	51%	44%	58%	45%	47%	48%	47%	46%
Probably yes	27%	24%	29%	31%	29%	28%	30%	29%
Probably no	11%	11%	6%	10%	11%	9%	10%	11%
Definitely no	11%	20%	7%	15%	14%	14%	13%	15%

Despite these largely progressive responses, a very strong 88% majority of respondents also rejected the idea that women should be able to travel alone without permission from their nearest male relatives. As further detailed below, supporters of the left-leaning parties were least likely to totally reject this notion, though a strong majority of them (63%) nevertheless did so. In their rejection of it they were followed by Fateh supporters, and lastly respondents inclined to support Hamas, 88% of whom totally rejected the proposition.

Figure 41: Women can travel alone without permission from father/husband/brother





Table 56: Women can travel alone without permission from father/husband/brother

	Place of residence		Poverty		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza	Below the poverty level	Above the poverty level	Fateh	Hamas	Others	Do not trust anyone
Totally reject	79%	83%	85%	75%	78%	88%	63%	82%
Reject	6%	9%	6%	9%	9%	6%	9%	6%
Neutral	4%	2%	3%	4%	4%	2%	5%	3%
Accept	4%	2%	2%	5%	4%	3%	11%	3%
Totally accept	7%	3%	4%	7%	5%	2%	12%	7%

With the respect to accepting women in official authority positions, answers were somewhat more positive. To the question of whether they would agree with a woman president, 58% answered no, though a significant share of respondents accordingly also felt differently.

Figure 42: Would you agree or disagree with the following? a female president?



Surprisingly perhaps, women were only slightly more likely than men to agree with a female president. The youngest age group was significantly more likely than all older generations to disagree with it, as were supporters of Hamas. Only among respondents inclined towards other political parties, primarily left-wing ones, did a majority answer yes. Contextually, it maybe noted that both Hamas and Fateh fielded female candidates in the 2005 general elections, and that women have sat on the cabinet in both Hamas and Fateh governments.

Table 57: Agree or disagree: a female president. (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village		Camp
Yes	45%	40%	36%	45%	41%	48%	47%	46%	39%	37%	42%
No	55%	60%	64%	55%	59%	52%	53%	54%	61%	63%	58%


Table 58: Agree or disagree: a female president. (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	48%	29%	59%	40%	44%	39%	39%	45%
No	52%	71%	41%	60%	56%	61%	61%	55%

X. Economic liberalism


In an earlier section of this report, which gauged the degree to which Palestinians agreed with broad principles associated with liberalism, it was noted that respondents were least in agreement with the idea that government intervention in the economy should be limited. The following section further explores Palestinian attitudes to what should be the role of state vis-à-vis the economy, showing inter alia that these reservations about a limited economic role for government also extend to other, more specific aspects of socio-economic policy.

Figure 43: Should the state guarantee free education?



As illustrated above, an overwhelming 95% majority believe that the government should guarantee free education for all citizens. A much lower share, 46%, feel that the government should be the only social institution responsible for marginalized groups, with the largest remaining bloc of respondents feeling that such groups should be cared for by all social institutions, including religious institutions and private institutions.

Figure 44: Who should be responsible for the marginalized groups in society?



To some degree, these responses may be attributable to the emphasis that Islam places on charity and alms giving, which is a responsibility of all Muslims. It may also be a function of strong traditions of community and family solidarity within Palestinian society, and a legacy of Arab socialist ideology. However, it may be noted that respondents inclined to support Hamas, who might be presumed to be more religious, and whose movement was originally launched as a social support organization, differ only slightly from other kinds of respondents in their expectations on the state, with a full 46% of them believing that the government should take responsibility for marginal groups. Otherwise it, was also noted that men, Fateh supporters, and respondents over the age of 55 were slightly more likely to emphasize the government's obligations towards marginalized groups.

Table 59: Who should be responsible for the marginalized groups in society? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)


	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village		Camp
State	51%	40%	42%	41%	45%	49%	60%	46%	43%	46%	45%
Religious institutions	6%	5%	6%	7%	5%	3%	6%	5%	6%	6%	5%
Private institutions	3%	5%	4%	6%	3%	4%	2%	4%	3%	6%	4%
All	40%	50%	47%	47%	47%	44%	32%	45%	48%	43%	45%

Table 60: Who should be responsible for the marginalized groups in society? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fatah	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
State	51%	46%	43%	43%	45%	46%	46%	45%
Religious institutions	6%	8%	8%	4%	6%	5%	6%	6%
Private institutions	3%	3%	6%	5%	3%	5%	4%	5%
All	40%	44%	43%	48%	46%	44%	45%	44%

In line with the above answers, a full 94% of respondents also feel that the government should be more involved in social welfare than is currently the case. In context, it should be noted that the Social Affairs Ministry of the Palestinian Authority is generally considered to be under-financed, and that the social protection afforded by the Palestinian Authority is generally incommensurate with the crisis-induced needs of its population.

Figure 45: Government should be more involved in social welfare



Again in line with existing trends, a 81% majority of Palestinians believe that the government should set a minimum wage, with responses varying very little across sub groups.

Figure 46: Do you support or oppose setting a minimum wage by the government?




Table 61: Support or oppose setting a minimum wage by the government? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp	
Support	83%	79%	77%	85%	80%	84%	85%	81%	81%	82%	81%
Oppose	17%	21%	23%	15%	20%	16%	15%	19%	19%	18%	19%

Table 62: Support or oppose setting a minimum wage by the government? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Support	80%	80%	90%	80%	82%	80%	78%	86%
Oppose	20%	20%	10%	20%	18%	20%	22%	14%

In a departure from classical liberalist principles, a nearly equal share of respondents (79%) also believed that the government should be responsible for setting salaries in general, rather than letting these be determined by market forces. Again, responses did not vary greatly across sub groups, though it may be noted that respondents who are inclined to support Fateh were slightly more supportive of this idea than the general population.

Figure 47: Who in your opinion should be responsible for setting salaries?




Table 63: Who should be responsible for setting salaries? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age				Area of residence			Total	
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village		Camp
The Government	78%	80%	76%	80%	81%	80%	86%	77%	82%	81%	79%
Market Forces	22%	20%	24%	20%	19%	20%	14%	23%	18%	19%	21%

Table 64: Who should be responsible for setting salaries? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
The Government	81%	77%	73%	78%	80%	78%	78%	80%
Market Forces	19%	23%	27%	22%	20%	22%	22%	20%

XI. Support for democracy

The following section gauges general Palestinian attitudes to democracy and the degree to which they feel this form of government is applicable in the oPt. As shown below, 77% of respondents believe that democracy is good for Palestine, with responses varying very little across sub groups.

Figure 48: Do you think that democracy is good for Palestine?




Table 65: Is democracy good for Palestine? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	Over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Definitely yes	47%	45%	45%	47%	45%	47%	49%	45%	47%	48%	46%
Probably yes	28%	32%	30%	32%	32%	26%	27%	31%	30%	30%	30%
Probably no	9%	11%	10%	10%	9%	11%	8%	9%	11%	11%	10%
Definitely no	16%	12%	15%	11%	14%	16%	15%	15%	13%	11%	14%

Table 66: Is democracy good for Palestine? (According to faction, residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Definitely yes	50%	45%	58%	41%	43%	50%	46%	48%
Probably yes	27%	33%	25%	32%	31%	29%	33%	27%
Probably no	10%	7%	4%	12%	11%	7%	9%	10%
Definitely no	13%	15%	12%	15%	14%	14%	12%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

When asked why they think democracy is good for Palestine, respondents most commonly answered that it will improve human right and personal freedoms (37%), the second most prevalent answer being that it reduces corruption. Notably, only 2% felt that democracy was good because it guaranteed private property. Answers varied very little as a function of gender, age, area of residence, place of residence and poverty level. With respect to factional affinity, however, it was somewhat interesting to note that respondents inclined towards Hamas were somewhat more likely than those leaning towards Fateh or other political parties to emphasize the importance of reducing corruption, rather than improving human rights and personal freedoms.

Figure 49: Why would democracy be good for Palestine?




Table 67: Why would democracy be good for Palestine? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
It will improve human rights and personal freedoms	37%	36%	33%	39%	37%	36%	33%	34%	38%	39%	36%
More efficient for development	10%	12%	11%	12%	13%	9%	9%	13%	9%	11%	11%
Peaceful resolution of conflict	17%	16%	18%	13%	18%	15%	19%	17%	16%	18%	16%
It reduces corruption	20%	23%	21%	19%	18%	27%	26%	21%	23%	19%	21%
Guarantees efficient administration	5%	4%	4%	7%	3%	2%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%
Guarantees private property	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	0%	2%
Other	10%	8%	10%	7%	10%	10%	7%	9%	9%	9%	9%

Table 68: Why would democracy be good for Palestine? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
It will improve human rights and personal freedoms	40%	36%	31%	34%	35%	39%	36%	35%
Efficient for development	10%	12%	18%	12%	11%	12%	11%	11%
Peaceful resolution of conflict	16%	15%	19%	17%	17%	15%	14%	19%
It reduces corruption	17%	29%	17%	22%	22%	20%	23%	19%
Guarantees efficient administration	5%	1%	5%	4%	3%	5%	5%	4%
Guarantees private property	2%	2%	3%	1%	3%	1%	2%	2%
Other	9%	5%	7%	9%	9%	8%	8%	10%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Respondents were somewhat more sceptical about whether democracy will work in Palestine, though a significant 62% majority nevertheless thought that it will. Again there were no major variances observed across sub groups, including among respondents leaning towards different political parties.

Figure 50: Do you think that democracy will work in Palestine?




Table 69: Will democracy work in Palestine? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Definitely yes	21%	17%	15%	21%	20%	22%	23%	21%	19%	14%	19%
Probably yes	39%	46%	41%	41%	44%	42%	48%	40%	45%	49%	43%
Probably no	17%	20%	24%	22%	18%	16%	8%	19%	19%	22%	19%
Definitely no	22%	16%	20%	17%	18%	20%	21%	20%	18%	15%	19%

Table 70: Will democracy work in Palestine? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Definitely yes	21%	19%	16%	18%	18%	22%	18%	21%
Probably yes	48%	43%	43%	39%	43%	42%	47%	39%
Probably no	15%	19%	20%	23%	22%	15%	20%	19%
Definitely no	16%	19%	22%	20%	17%	22%	15%	21%

XII. Models for Palestine

Having outlined some aspects of Palestinian attitudes towards the state, individual rights and freedoms; the relationship between religion and government; the role that the state should play in the economy; the limits of its power to punish crime and otherwise regulate social behaviour; and their general support for democratic governance, the following section seeks to map what other countries Palestinians would identify as models for their own society, the degree to which they feel their society could adopt European forms of democracy, including liberal principles of governance, and what political parties best represent these principles at present.

When asked what country they would like Palestine to be modelled after, respondents most commonly answered other Arab countries, among these Saudi Arabia, followed by Jordan. 14% answered a European country, and 4% the United States. Notably, however, a full 26% said no country, suggesting perhaps that the particular social priorities that a large number of Palestinians have set for themselves are not adequately addressed by other countries, or that they would like to make a fresh start in building their own society.

Figure 51: The country that the Palestinians would like Palestine to be modeled after



To a large degree these responses are readily intelligible in terms of the answers given to previous survey questions. As noted earlier, Palestinians favour a strong state which is able to provide free education, intervene in the market to set wages, and take substantial responsibility for marginal groups. They also favour a government guided by religious principles. In these respects, Saudi Arabia, which is both wealthy and governed to a great degree on the basis of religious law, fits the bill.

However, neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan are democratic countries, both are beset by widely publicized corruption, and neither freedom of speech nor individual rights and freedoms are safeguarded by the state; all of which social features are cited as being desirable by Palestinians, and which are more likely to be manifested in European countries. This latter group of countries are however secular in nature, and culturally different from the Arab world, particularly with respect to their social mores. Indeed, as noted below, a full 72% of respondent do not believe that European democracy can be a model for Palestine, with no sub group comprising a majority who disagree with this general sentiment.

Figure 52: Can European democracy be a model for Palestine?




Table 71: Can European democracy be a model for Palestine? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Definitely yes	7%	5%	6%	7%	4%	7%	7%	7%	4%	7%	6%
Probably yes	25%	19%	20%	25%	21%	22%	23%	21%	21%	26%	22%
Probably no	24%	26%	22%	27%	28%	23%	25%	24%	27%	24%	25%
Definitely no	44%	51%	51%	41%	47%	49%	45%	47%	47%	43%	47%

Table 72: Can European democracy be a model for Palestine? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Definitely yes	8%	3%	16%	4%	6%	7%	4%	8%
Probably yes	25%	17%	27%	22%	21%	22%	23%	20%
Probably no	26%	21%	22%	26%	27%	21%	27%	25%
Definitely no	40%	59%	34%	48%	46%	50%	45%	46%

The above speculation is further reinforced by the commonly cited feeling that Europeans are generally less moral than Palestinians, a sentiment which furthermore holds constant across all sub groups, with exception of respondents inclined to support other parties but Fateh and Hamas, primarily including the left-leaning, secular ones. Supporters of Hamas are most likely to agree (75%).

Figure 53: Do you think that Europeans are in general...




Table 73: Europeans are generally ... (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Less moral than us	64%	70%	66%	65%	69%	68%	68%	64%	73%	69%
As moral	12%	14%	13%	15%	10%	14%	14%	15%	10%	9%
More moral than us	25%	16%	21%	20%	20%	18%	19%	21%	17%	22%

Table 74: Europeans are generally... (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Faction				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Are less moral than us	65%	75%	49%	66%	68%	65%	69%	64%
As moral	11%	6%	27%	15%	14%	11%	12%	15%
More moral than us	24%	19%	24%	19%	18%	24%	18%	22%

Figure 54: How do you view liberal principles?



With specific reference to the applicability of liberal principles, respondents were somewhat more supportive. Discounting those 24% of respondents who did not feel that they knew enough about such principles to venture an opinion, 44% felt that liberal principles could be applied whether in their entirety or in some part to all societies, including the Arab world; 32% felt that they were only applicable to the West.

Among various cross segments of respondents, party affiliation seemed to be the most determinant variable. Respondents inclined to support Fateh were most likely, at 50%, to feel that liberal principles could be applied either partly or in toto to other parts of the world, whereas only 32% of those who expressed trust in Hamas said the same.

Table 75: How do you view liberal principles? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
A Western political and philosophical school only in the West	29%	40%	27%	34%	29%	34%	31%	33%
A universal school that is applicable to all societies	30%	15%	23%	24%	21%	29%	23%	24%
School that can be applied to a certain extent to this world	20%	17%	28%	20%	21%	17%	17%	24%
I do not know enough about it	21%	28%	22%	23%	29%	20%	29%	20%

Not surprisingly, when asked what political party today best represents liberal principles, respondents singled out Fateh, in particular those who are themselves inclined to support that party. In general, however, only 27% of respondents overall singled out Fateh in this regard, with highest number feeling that no party represents liberal principles in the oPt. Of particular note, among that large segment of disaffected respondents who trust in no party, only 18% felt that Fateh best represented liberal principles.

Figure 55: Who today in Palestine best represents liberal principles?




Table 76: Who in Palestine today best represents liberal principles? (According to gender, age, and residence)


	Gender		Age					Area of residence			Total
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp	
Fateh	29%	24%	29%	26%	23%	30%	27%	25%	26%	33%	27%
Hamas	5%	6%	8%	6%	3%	4%	1%	4%	7%	7%	5%
Other	8%	8%	7%	9%	10%	4%	11%	11%	5%	5%	8%
No one	58%	62%	56%	59%	65%	61%	61%	60%	62%	55%	60%

Table 77: Who in Palestine today best represents liberal principles? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Other	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Fateh	40%	28%	18%	18%	26%	28%	27%	28%
Hamas	7%	13%	4%	3%	5%	5%	6%	5%
Other	7%	1%	19%	10%	9%	7%	7%	10%
No one	45%	58%	59%	69%	61%	59%	61%	58%

In light of widespread Palestinian disaffection with the existing political system, there does seem to be some scope for a new political party to enter the political arena. A 53% majority of respondents said they would consider joining such a party if its objectives agreed largely with their own. Of note however, among that segment of the population which is disaffected, the proportion of respondents who felt the same was not significantly higher than the general average. Whether such a party would be successful on the basis of a platform built around liberal principles is another matter, however, and while the survey provides some support for this possibility, it also suggests that Palestinians are very unlikely to embrace an ideology modelled wholesale on European liberalism.

Figure 56: Would you consider joining a new party if its objectives are largely consistent with yours?



**Table 78: Would you consider joining a new party if its objectives are largely consistent with yours?
(According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)**

	Faction				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Definitely yes	23%	22%	25%	23%	23%	24%	23%	24%
Probably yes	23%	31%	39%	29%	29%	27%	27%	31%
Probably no	8%	8%	8%	6%	9%	5%	7%	8%
Definitely no	46%	39%	28%	41%	40%	44%	43%	37%

XIII. Profiling liberalism in Palestine

Having evaluated Palestinian responses to a wide range of questions reflecting their receptiveness to and support for liberal principles, the report now seeks to collate a these responses into a national liberalism index for the oPt..


The index is constructed based on a scoring of responses to 17 of the survey questions analyzed in the previous chapters. In answering the questions, each respondent was asked to rank each of these issues on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 being total rejection to the issue and 10, being total approval of that issue.

- Women can travel alone without permission from father/husband/brother
- Individual freedoms may not be limited by the state
- State interference in the economy should be limited
- The Hijab should be enforced by the state
- Selling alcohol to adults should be a private issue
- All people shall have equal rights irrespective of religion
- Civil marriage should be allowed
- People convicted of murder should not face capital punishment
- Government should be more involved in social welfare
- Religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools
- Free education to all should be guaranteed
- Religious minorities should be protected
- Guaranteeing free and independent media
- Political pluralism should be guaranteed
- State should guarantee individual rights and liberties
- People are the source of all laws
- Religion is the source of all laws

The answers were then summed up and a score was generated. The higher the score, the higher is the level of liberalism and vice versa. NEC has opted to take a relative score of liberalism rather than an absolute score. The highest score generated from the answers of the respondents is regarded here as high level of liberalism (although in absolute terms, this high score is significantly lower than the highest possible score).

Based on their standard deviations from the mean score, the sample population was classified into relative categories of “liberal”, “in between”, and “not liberal.” As shown below, 27% were accordingly classified as liberal, 29% as not liberal, and 45% as in between. By cross-tabulating this classification with information about the respondents, we are able, inter alia, to produce a profile of Palestinian liberals, and their attitudes to a range of social and political issues. In many respects, this profile reinforces earlier findings from the report.

Figure 57: Proportion of liberals in Palestinian society



As shown below, Palestinian women are significantly more likely than men to be “not liberal”; whereas 62% of not liberals were women, only 38% were men.

Table 79: Gender (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Male	38%	51%	54%
Female	62%	49%	46%

It could also be observed that place of residence, i.e. whether the respondents were from the West Bank or Gaza Strip, seemed to be a determining variable, as was their age, and factional trust. Whereas 62% of liberal respondents were from the West Bank and 38% from Gaza, the latter region had relatively higher proportion of not liberal respondents (42%) whereas West Bankers were less predominant in this category.

Table 80: Place of residence (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
West Bank	58%	58%	62%
Gaza Strip	42%	42%	38%

With respect to age groups, the youngest generation, comprising the 18-24 age group, evinced the sharpest imbalance; 34% of such respondents were not liberal, and only 21% were liberal. The trend is reversed among the older generation; among the 55 and over group, respondents are nearly twice as likely to be liberal as not liberal.

Table 81: Age (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
18-24yrs	34%	31%	21%
25-34yrs	21%	23%	27%
35-44yrs	27%	21%	25%
45-54yrs	11%	17%	17%
over 55yrs	6%	9%	11%

As previous sections of the report would suggest, respondents who are inclined to trust Fateh are more likely to be liberal than not liberal, whereas the opposite holds true for those who incline towards Hamas. The sharpest distinction however is evinced among those trust one of the smaller political parties, most of which are left-wing Marxist groups; within this small sub-population, respondents are twice as likely to be liberal rather than not liberal. Otherwise, it may also be noted that among that predominant section of the population which remains dissatisfied with all of the political parties, slightly more people are not liberal, as opposed to liberal.

Table 82: Factional trust(According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Fateh	30%	34%	37%
Hamas	14%	16%	10%
Others	3%	6%	8%
Do not trust anyone	52%	43%	45%

Meanwhile, however, there were no significant variances among city dwellers, villagers and refugee camp residents; between respondents who are refugees and those who are not, and between the poor and non-poor.

Table 83: Area of residence(According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
City	55%	53%	55%
Village	31%	31%	32%
Refugee Camp	14%	16%	12%

Table 84: Refugee Status (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Refugee	44%	45%	45%
Non-refugee	56%	55%	55%

Table 85: Poverty (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Below the poverty level	54%	54%	51%
Above the poverty level	46%	46%	49%

Generally, liberals were significantly more likely than their non-liberal peers to be very active in civic activities like volunteering, charity events, as well as political rallies and meetings, and somewhat more likely to be more active to some extent.

Table 86: Level of involvement in civic activities like volunteering or participating in charity events? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Very active	15%	22%	23%
Active to some extent	35%	37%	39%
Not active	50%	41%	38%

Table 87: Level of involvement in civic activities like attending political rallies or meetings? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Very active	9%	15%	19%
Active to some extent	25%	27%	30%
Not active	66%	57%	51%

In further developing our profile of Palestinian liberals, it can be noted that they are significantly less likely than their illiberal peers to obtain their information primarily from the international media, e.g. Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyyah, and somewhat more likely to rely on local TV and newspapers. Interestingly, they differed very little, however, in their reliance on the internet.

Table 88: Source of information you use most(According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Newspapers	8%	9%	11%
Local TV	20%	21%	25%
Local radios	6%	7%	9%
Internet	23%	22%	22%
Friends/Word of mouth	4%	4%	5%
Political leaders	1%	0%	0%
Religious leaders	1%	2%	1%
International media	34%	32%	25%
Other	1%	2%	2%

Not surprisingly perhaps, liberals were also more likely to identify themselves first as a Palestinian rather than a Muslim, whereas the opposite held true among those who were not liberal.

Table 89: How do you identify yourself? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
A Palestinian first	24%	29%	36%
A Muslim first	47%	41%	33%
An Arab first	3%	4%	7%
A human being first	25%	25%	23%
Other	1%	1%	0%

As such, liberals were also more than twice as likely as illiberal respondents to see themselves as secularists, and significantly less likely to regard themselves as religious. As further detailed below, they were also somewhat less likely to feel that religion has a major impact on their personal life, though this difference was not very pronounced.

Table 90: Do you identify yourself as a secularist or a religious person? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
A secularist	9%	13%	25%
A religious person	75%	69%	49%
Both together	16%	18%	26%

Table 91: The role or impact of religion on your personal life (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Plays a major role	55%	55%	45%
Plays an important role	32%	29%	35%
Has a small impact	7%	10%	13%
Has no impact whatsoever	6%	6%	7%

Liberals were twice as likely as their peers to strongly approve of the idea that it is possible for an individual to be a secularist and to be religious at the same time. Paradoxically perhaps, in light of this finding, they were also twice as likely as their peers to feel that there is a contradiction on some level between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.

Table 92: Agree or disagree: Is it possible for an individual to be a secularist yet being religious?" (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Strongly approve	9%	13%	20%
Approve	34%	29%	39%
Disapprove	24%	29%	24%
Strongly disapprove	33%	28%	17%

Table 93: Approve or disapprove: Is there a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Strongly approve	6%	9%	13%
Approve	22%	18%	22%
Disapprove	34%	36%	31%
Strongly disapprove	38%	37%	33%

Turning to the role of religion in governance, liberals are twice as likely as their peers to feel that civil law should be the main source of their country's law, as opposed to the Quran and

the Sunna; those who were classified as not liberal preferred the latter by share of 60%. However, the highest share of liberals (40%) nevertheless feel that both of these sources should inform the promulgation of national laws, and 38% of liberals also said that they wanted this law to be derived from religious sources.

Table 94: Main source of the law (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Civil law	8%	10%	22%
The Quran and the Sunna	60%	52%	38%
Both at the same level	33%	39%	40%

Whereas it was clear that liberals were much more likely than those who are not liberal to want to live in a secular state rather than a state governed by religion – indeed nearly three times as much so – a majority of liberals nevertheless wanted to live in a religious state.

Table 95: Do you prefer to live in a secular state or in a state governed by religion? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
A secular state	13%	19%	38%
A state governed by religion	87%	81%	62%

With respect to their social outlook, liberals were somewhat more likely than their peers to support democracy if it stipulated that women should be equal to men in all respects, but this difference, while significant, was not overwhelming.

Table 96: Would you support democracy if it says that women shall be equal to men in all levels? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Definitely yes	45%	47%	57%
Probably yes	23%	28%	26%
Probably no	13%	10%	8%
Definitely no	19%	14%	8%

A stronger correlation was noted with respect to the question of a female president; a majority of liberals supported this idea, while a strong majority of those who are not liberal opposed it. Furthermore, whereas the population as a whole is strongly against a Christian president, including 80% of those who are not liberal, liberals were almost evenly split on this question.

Table 97: Agree or disagree: A woman president (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Yes	33%	38%	58%
No	67%	62%	42%

Table 98: Agree or disagree: A Christian president (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Yes	20%	31%	49%
No	80%	69%	51%

Turning to the question of economic liberalism, only slight difference were noted between liberals and illiberal respondents; 84% of the former group felt that the government should set a minimum wage, whereas 73% of the latter agreed. There was virtually no difference with respect to the government's overall role in setting salaries, with liberals and not-liberals agreeing very strongly that it should, rather than market forces.

Table 99: Support or oppose setting a minimum wage by the government? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Support	73%	84%	84%
Oppose	27%	16%	16%

Table 100: Who should be responsible for setting salaries? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
The Government	80%	80%	81%
Market Forces	20%	20%	19%

Some variance was observed when the liberalism of the respondents was cross-tabulated with their feelings of whether democracy is good for Palestine. 52% of liberals said definitely yes, compared to 44% of not liberals. Strong majorities among both groups answered yes to some extent. And whereas liberals were again slightly more optimistic than not liberals that democracy will actually work in Palestine, the differences on this issue were slight.

Table 101: Is democracy good for Palestine? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Definitely yes	44%	48%	52%
Probably yes	33%	30%	23%
Probably no	9%	7%	12%
Definitely no	14%	15%	13%

Table 102: Will democracy work in Palestine? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Definitely yes	15%	21%	20%
Probably yes	44%	41%	40%
Probably no	20%	18%	22%
Definitely no	20%	19%	18%

To the question of whether European democracy could be a model for Palestine, liberals were more than twice as likely than their illiberal peers to answer definitely yes, but this group is very small as a share of the overall population, and in those response categories that dominated, there were rather few differences among liberals, illiberal respondents, and those poised in between.

Table 103: Can European Democracy be a model for Palestine? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Definitely yes	4%	6%	9%
Probably yes	21%	21%	26%
Probably no	24%	26%	23%
Definitely no	51%	47%	42%

It may also be noted that a majority of liberal respondents agreed with the majority sentiment that Europeans are generally less moral than Palestinians, though they were significantly less likely than their peers to feel this way.

Table 104: Europeans generally are...(According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Are less moral than us	70%	70%	56%
As moral	10%	11%	17%
More moral than us	20%	19%	27%

Nevertheless, liberals were more likely, if not dramatically so, to feel that liberal principles could be applied universally, or that it could be applied to a certain extent to their own part of the world.

Table 105: How do you view liberal principles? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
A Western political and philosophical school only in the West	32%	35%	31%
A universal school that is applicable to all societies	23%	24%	30%
A school that can be applied to a certain extent to this world	16%	20%	21%
I do not know enough about it	29%	21%	18%

XIV. Attitudes to peace and coexistence

Having gauged Palestinian attitudes to various aspects of liberalism, the survey concludes with a brief examination of their attitudes to peacemaking and coexistence. As shown below, 71% are in favour of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews, a majority sentiment which holds across categories of respondents, except those supportive of Hamas, only 44% of whom agree. It may also be noted that support for position is alarmingly thin among the youngest, 18-24 age group, only 54% of whom express support for it. Contrariwise, the oldest group of respondents, those aged over 55, express the strongest support for reconciliation, at 84%

Figure 58: Are you for reconciliation between Arabs and Jews?




Table 106: Are you for reconciliation between Arabs and Jews? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Yes	73%	69%	54%	75%	75%	79%	84%	72%	71%	67%
No	27%	31%	46%	25%	25%	21%	16%	28%	29%	33%

Table 107: Are you for reconciliation between Arabs and Jews? (According to faction, place of residence, and poverty level)

	Faction		Factional trust		Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	85%	44%	66%	69%	70%	71%	70%	73%
No	15%	56%	34%	31%	30%	29%	30%	27%

Of note, respondents who fall within the liberal category were significantly more likely than their peers to be in favour of reconciliation between Arabs and Jews.

Table 108: Are you for reconciliation between Arabs and Jews?

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Yes	67%	66%	80%
No	33%	34%	20%

56% of respondents believe that the best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through negotiations alone, while 21% believe that both negotiations and military means are necessary, and 23% feel that only military means will be effective. Only among supporters of

Hamas did a majority favour military means alone. In general, liberal respondents were more likely than the general population to be in favour of negotiations alone, and roughly in agreement with the majority in giving the response both military means and negotiations.

Figure 59: The best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through...




Table 109: The best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through...? (According to gender, age, and residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55yrs over	City	Village	Camp
Military Means	25%	22%	31%	21%	19%	22%	21%	23%	22%	26%
Negotiations	56%	57%	46%	59%	59%	62%	63%	57%	58%	51%
Both	20%	21%	23%	19%	22%	17%	16%	20%	20%	23%

Table 110: The best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through...? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Faction				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Military Means	9%	57%	37%	23%	23%	23%	25%	22%
Negotiations	73%	29%	48%	53%	58%	54%	55%	59%
Both	18%	14%	15%	24%	19%	23%	20%	19%

Table 111: The best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through...? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Military Means	26%	28%	16%
Negotiations	58%	53%	62%
Both	16%	18%	21%

Respondents are evenly divided on whether they could imagine a Jew as their neighbor in the event that all settlers were to leave Palestine. Again, it could be noticed that the youngest age group seems more radicalized in this respect, with only 41% answering in the affirmative, compared to 69% of respondents older than 55. Furthermore, while slim majorities of Fateh supporters and respondents leaning towards the other political parties could image a Jew as their neighbour, only 45% of respondents who incline towards Hamas said the same.

Figure 60: Taking into consideration that there are all settlers are out of Palestine, can you imagine a Jew as a neighbour?




Table 112: Can you imagine a Jew as your neighbour if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Yes	60%	40%	41%	48%	48%	60%	69%	54%	43%	47%
No	40%	60%	59%	52%	52%	40%	31%	46%	57%	53%

Table 113: Can you imagine a Jew as your neighbour if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)


	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	53%	45%	56%	48%	49%	51%	46%	54%
No	47%	55%	44%	52%	51%	49%	54%	46%

Table 114: Can you imagine a Jew as your neighbour if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Yes	42%	52%	58%
No	58%	48%	42%

When asked whether they could imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen, presuming that all settlers had been evacuated from Palestine, responses were slightly more negative still, with 58% answering no.

Figure 61: Taking into consideration that there are all settlers are out of Palestine, can you imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen?



A major factor in this pattern of responses seems to be a sharp difference in the attitudes of men and women; whereas 54% of men could imagine a Jew as a Palestinian, only 31% of women felt the same. It was also striking that age seemed to have a marked impact on the answers; the younger the respondent, the less likely they were to answer yes, with only 35% of the youngest cohort doing so. Respondents leaning towards Fateh and Hamas both answered in the negative by slight majorities, and only among those inclined towards the other political parties did a majority answer in the affirmative. There was only a slight “liberal effect” among the answers, with liberals being fractionally more likely to answer yes than their peers.

Table 115: Can you imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
Yes	54%	31%	35%	37%	40%	52%	62%	45%	36%	40%
No	46%	69%	65%	63%	60%	48%	38%	55%	64%	60%

Table 116 : Can you imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Faction				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
Yes	42%	40%	55%	40%	41%	43%	39%	45%
No	58%	60%	45%	60%	59%	57%	61%	55%

Table 117: Can you imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen if all settlers were out of Palestine? (According to liberalism)

	Level of liberalism		
	Not liberal	In between	Liberal
Yes	33%	43%	52%
No	67%	57%	48%

In the interest, of examining the extent to which nationalist feelings might determine the respondents’ reactions to social or political disputes, without specifying whether this dispute involved Israelis or not, respondents were asked whether they would side with a Palestinian against a non-Palestinian even if the Palestinian was wrong. As shown below, 54% said that they would always side with the non-Palestinian, regardless of whether they were wrong or right, with very minor variation across all sub groups.

Figure 62: Would you side with a Palestinian against a non-Palestinian even if the Palestinian was wrong?




Table 118: Would you side with a Palestinian against a non-Palestinian even if the Palestinian was wrong? (According to gender, age, and area of residence)

	Gender.		Age					Area of residence.		
	Male	Female	18-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	over 55yrs	City	Village	Camp
If the non-Palestinian is right and the Palestinian is wrong	36%	35%	38%	36%	30%	34%	37%	37%	32%	36%
I will not interfere	10%	12%	10%	10%	14%	11%	13%	12%	10%	10%
I will always side with the Palestinian regardless	54%	53%	52%	54%	56%	55%	50%	51%	57%	53%

Table 119: Would you side with a Palestinian against a non-Palestinian even if the Palestinian was wrong? (According to faction place of residence, and poverty level)

	Factional trust				Place of residence		Poverty all	
	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Below poverty	Above poverty
If the non-Palestinian is right and the Palestinian is wrong	35%	36%	40%	34%	38%	31%	33%	37%
I will not interfere	10%	5%	16%	14%	12%	11%	11%	12%
I will always side with the Palestinian regardless	56%	59%	45%	52%	51%	58%	56%	51%

XV. Conclusion

Palestinians are clearly receptive to many key principles of liberal politics, including democratic governance, political pluralism, freedom of speech, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

One exception to this rule is their attitude to economic liberalism. Contrary to classical liberal tenets, Palestinians believe that the state should play a significant role in determining salaries, though it may be that such attitudes are in large part a function of the prevailing economic crisis in the oPt, and the populations' concomitant over-reliance on the Palestinian Authority as a source of employment. Another issue of note is the respondents' rejection of secular government, a rejection which might undermine the openness and tolerance of any Palestinian state.

Furthermore, Palestinian support for most of the *principles* of liberalism belies some notable counterexamples at the level of social and political practice. By example, whereas an overwhelming majority of respondents endorsed the notion that women and men should have equal rights, only a minority of respondents, if also a sizeable one, would want to be governed by a female president. Similarly, while respondents are strongly supportive of equal rights for Muslims and Christians, only a very small minority would want to be governed by a Christian president.

Otherwise, it was also noted that respondents largely support capital punishment, and that their feelings on some women's issues reflect a strongly socially conservative outlook by western standards, even if it is relatively progressive by regional standards. By and large, it was observed that women and respondents in the youngest 18-24 age group were often considerably more conservative in their outlook than other sample groups.

When asked about whether they felt that Western liberal principles were applicable to Palestine, the respondents were tentatively supportive, with the largest number of respondents agreeing that such principles could be applied either in toto or partially. One possible reason for enduring scepticism on this issue is that respondents were reluctant to adopt Western standards of morality, which are viewed by a majority of Palestinians as being too permissive.

Such apprehensions are likely also one of the main reasons for why only 14% of respondents believe that European democracy can be a model for Palestine. It is ironic that only 4% felt that the US could provide such a model, because the social and religious conservatism evinced by most respondents may de facto be more akin to the American idiom of democracy rather than the European one.

XVI. Annexes

Questionnaire in English

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENT				
R1	How optimistic are you about the future?	1. <i>Very optimistic</i> 2. <i>Optimistic</i> 3. <i>Pessimistic</i>	4. <i>Very Pessimistic</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R1
R2	What is the main concern for you and your household?	1. <i>Employment</i> 2. <i>Health</i> 3. <i>Education</i> 4. <i>Internal security</i> 5. <i>Occupation</i>	6. <i>General lack of good quality of life</i> 7. <i>Personal problems</i> 8. <i>Other reasons_____</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R2
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE HOUSEHOLD				
G1	How many people over the age of 18 live in this household?	/___/___/ adults		G1
G2	How many people below the age of 18 live in the household?	/___/___/ children		G2
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION				
E1	Are you currently employed or not?	1. <i>Employed full-time</i> 2. <i>Employed part-time</i> 3. <i>Employed for few hours</i> 4. <i>Not employed</i>	5. <i>I am a housewife</i> 6. <i>I am a student</i> 7. <i>I am retired</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	E1
E2	Employer	1. <i>The Palestinian Authority</i> 2. <i>An international organization</i> 3. <i>A local NGO</i> 4. <i>Employed in the private sector</i> 5. <i>Self-employed (agric. Industry, trade, etc.)</i> 6. <i>Small trade (street sellers...)</i> 88. <i>Not applicable</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		E2
E3	Employment sector	1. <i>Agriculture</i> 2. <i>Trade and commerce</i> 3. <i>Industry</i> 4. <i>Construction</i> 5. <i>Computers and IT</i> 6. <i>Services (banking, insurance)</i>	7. <i>Health</i> 8. <i>Education</i> 9. <i>Other (specify)___</i> 88. <i>Not applicable</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	E3
Source of information				
SI1	Which source of information do you use most	1. <i>Newspapers</i> 2. <i>Local TV</i> 3. <i>Local radios</i> 4. <i>Internet</i> 5. <i>Friends</i>	6. <i>Political leaders</i> 7. <i>Religious leaders</i> 8. <i>International media</i> 9. <i>Other_____</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	SI1
Religion (R)				
R1	Some say that there is a contradiction between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. Do you approve or disapprove with this statement	1. <i>Strongly approve</i> 2. <i>Approve</i> 3. <i>Disapprove</i>	4. <i>Strongly Disapprove</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R1
R2	In your opinion, what is the main cause behind religious extremism in the oPt?	1. <i>Poverty and unemployment</i> 2. <i>Fear of modernity</i> 3. <i>Influence of religious leaders (religious discourse)</i> 4. <i>Israeli occupation</i> 5. <i>The enmity the west has towards Islam</i> 6. <i>Low education</i> 7. <i>Moral decadence</i> 8. <i>Corruption</i> 9. <i>There is no religious extremism</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		R2
R3	What in your opinion should be the main source of the law?	1. <i>Civil Law</i> 2. <i>The Quran and the Sunna</i> 3. <i>Both at the same level</i>		R3
R4	What is the role/impact of religion on your personal life?	1. <i>Plays a major role</i>	4. <i>Has no impact whatsoever</i>	R4

		2. <i>Plays an important role</i> 3. <i>Has a small impact</i>	99. <i>DK/NA</i>	
R5	What about the community you live in, to what extent would you say that religion plays a role in it?	1. <i>Plays a major role</i> 2. <i>Plays an important role</i> 3. <i>Has some role</i>	4. <i>Has a small role</i> 5. <i>Has no role whatsoever</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R5
R6	Do you agree with this statement? "It is possible for an individual to be a secularist yet be religious"	1. <i>Strongly approve</i> 2. <i>Approve</i> 3. <i>Disapprove</i>	4. <i>Strongly Disapprove</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R6
R7	Are you religious more in belief, in practice, or in both equally?	1. <i>More in belief than practice</i> 2. <i>More in practice than in belief</i> 3. <i>Both equally</i>	4. <i>Neither</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R7
R8	Would you say that	1. <i>Islam plays a bigger role in Palestinian politics than three years ago</i> 2. <i>Plays about the same role as three years ago</i> 3. <i>Plays a lesser role than three years ago</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		R8
R9	Under a religious state personal freedom and Human rights will increase, decrease, or remain the same?	1. <i>will definitely increase</i> 2. <i>will increase</i> 3. <i>Will decrease</i>	4. <i>Will definitely decrease</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	R9
Identity (ID)				
ID1	How do you identify yourself?	1. <i>A Palestinian first</i> 2. <i>A Muslim first</i> 3. <i>An Arab first</i>	4. <i>A human being first</i> 5. <i>Other</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	ID1
ID2	Do you personally identify yourself as a secularist or as a religious person?	1. <i>A secularist</i> 2. <i>A religious person</i>		ID2
ID3	Do you identify yourself with the modernists or the traditionalists liberals	1. <i>With the modernists</i> 2. <i>With the traditionalists</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		ID3
ID4	Do you prefer to live in a secular state or in a state governed by religion?	1. <i>A secular state</i> 2. <i>A state governed by religion</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		ID4
Democratic values (DV)				
DV1	Do you think that democracy is good for Palestine?	1. <i>Definitely yes</i> 2. <i>probably yes</i> 3. <i>Probably no</i>	4. <i>Definitely no</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV1
DV2	Do you think that democracy will work in Palestine?	1. <i>Definitely yes</i> 2. <i>probably yes</i> 3. <i>Probably no</i>	4. <i>Definitely no</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV2
DV3	Why would democracy be good for Palestine? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS)	1. <i>It will improve human rights and personal freedoms</i> 2. <i>More efficient for development</i> 3. <i>Peaceful resolution of conflict</i> 4. <i>It reduces corruption</i> 5. <i>Guarantees efficient administration</i> 6. <i>Guarantees private property</i> 7. <i>Other</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		DV3
DV4	Democracy says that women shall be equal to men in all levels, would you support democracy then?	1. <i>Definitely yes</i> 2. <i>probably yes</i> 3. <i>Probably no</i>	4. <i>Definitely no</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV4
DV5	Which system of government do you want Palestine to be modeled after?	----- 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		DV5
DV6	Can European Democracy be a model for Palestine?	1. <i>Definitely yes</i> 2. <i>probably yes</i> 3. <i>Probably no</i>	4. <i>Definitely no</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV6
DV7	Women are discriminated against in Palestine	1. <i>Strongly agree</i> 2. <i>Agree</i> 3. <i>Disagree</i>	4. <i>Strongly disagree</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV7
DV8	Would you agree or disagree with the following? A Christian president	1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i>	99. <i>DK/NA</i>	DV8

DV9	Would you agree or disagree with the following? A woman president	1. Yes 2. No	99. DK/NA	DV9										
DV10	Do you support or oppose that Christians be equal to Muslims in all rights and obligations?	1. Support 2. Oppose 99. DK/NA		DV10										
DV11	State corruption is a danger to democracy and the rule of law	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree	4. Strongly disagree 99. DK/NA	DV11										
Liberalism (LI)														
LI2	Liberalism political principles stand for civil rights, equal opportunities, free market competition, pluralism, openness, and the limited role of the government. Do you approve or disapprove with this ideology?	1. Strongly approve 2. Approve 3. In between 4. Disapprove 5. Strongly disapprove 99. DK/NA		LI2										
LI2	Who today in Palestine best represents these principles?	1. Fateh 2. Hamas	3. Other 99. DK/NA	LI2										
LI3	How do you view liberal principles?	99. A western political and philosophical school that is applicable only to the West 1. A universal school that is applicable to all societies 2. A school that can be applied to a certain extent to this part of the world 3. I do not know enough about it		LI3										
LI4	Who should be responsible for the marginalized groups in society?	1. State 2. Religion 3. Private institution	4. All 99. DK/NA	LI4										
	Do you support or oppose setting a minimum wage by the government?	1. Yes 2. No												
LI5	Who in your opinion should be responsible for setting salaries?	1. The Government 2. Market forces 3. DK/NA		LI5										
LI6	Do you accept or reject the following: On a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 being totally reject and 10 totally accept			LI6										
LI6a	Women can travel alone without permission from father/husband/brother	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6a
LI6b	Individual freedoms may not be limited by the state	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6b
LI6c	State interference in the economy should be limited	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6c
LI6d	The Hijab should be enforced by the state	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6d
LI6e	Selling alcohol to adults should be a private issue	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6e
LI6g	All people shall have equal rights irrespective of religion	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6g
LI6h	Civil marriage should be allowed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6h
LI6i	People convicted of murder should not face capital punishment	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6i
LI6j	Government should be more involved in social welfare	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6j
LI6k	Religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6k
LI6l	Free education to all should be guaranteed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6l
LI6m	Religious minorities should be protected	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6m
LI6n	Guaranteeing free and independent media	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6n
LI6o	Political pluralism should be guaranteed	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6o
LI6p	State should guarantee individual rights and liberties	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6p
LI6q	People are the source of all laws	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6q
LI6r	Religion is the source of all laws	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	LI6r
LI7	How important are the following....	Law and order			1. Very important 2. Important 3. Unimportant	4. Very Unimportant 99. DK/NA	LI6a							

	Religiosity	1. <i>Very important</i> 2. <i>Important</i> 3. <i>Unimportant</i>	4. <i>Very Unimportant</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	LI6a	
	Rule of law	1. <i>Very important</i> 2. <i>Important</i> 3. <i>Unimportant</i>	4. <i>Very Unimportant</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	LI6b	
	Social justice	1. <i>Very important</i> 2. <i>Important</i> 3. <i>Unimportant</i>	4. <i>Very Unimportant</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	LI6c	
	Tolerance	1. <i>Very important</i> 2. <i>Important</i> 3. <i>Unimportant</i>	4. <i>Very Unimportant</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	LI6d	
COMMON					
C1	What is your level of involvement in civic activities like volunteering, or participating in charity events?	1. <i>Very active</i> 2. <i>Active to some extent</i>	3. <i>Not active</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	C1	
C2	What is your level of involvement in civic activities like attending political rallies or meetings?	1. <i>Very active</i> 2. <i>Active to some extent</i>	3. <i>Not active</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	C2	
C3	Do you think that the Europeans in general	1. <i>Are less moral than us</i> 2. <i>As moral</i> 3. <i>More moral than us</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		C3	
C4	The best way to reach a settlement with Israel is through	1. <i>Military Means</i> 2. <i>Negotiations</i>	3. <i>Both</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	C4	
C5	Are you for reconciliation between Arabs and Jews?	1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i>	3. <i>Other</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	C5	
C6a	Taking into consideration that there are all settlers are out of Palestine, can you imagine a Jew as a neighbor?	1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i>	99. <i>DK/NA</i>	C6	
C6b	Taking into consideration that there are all settlers are out of Palestine, can you imagine a Jew as a Palestinian citizen?	1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>			
C7	Would you side with a Palestinian against a non-Palestinian even if the Palestinian was wrong?	1. <i>Only if the non-Palestinian is right and the Palestinian is wrong</i> 2. <i>I will not interfere</i> 3. <i>I will always side with the Palestinian regardless</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		C7	
INCOME					
I1	In general, what is the household monthly income?	1. <i>Over 5000 NIS</i> 2. <i>Between NIS 4500-4999</i> 3. <i>Between NIS 4000-4499</i> 4. <i>Between NIS 3500-3999</i> 5. <i>Between NIS 3000-3499</i> 6. <i>Between NIS 2500-2999</i> 7. <i>Between NIS 2000-2499</i>	8. <i>Between NIS 1500-1999</i> 9. <i>Between NIS 1000-1499</i> 10. <i>Between NIS 500-999</i> 11. <i>Less than NIS 500</i> 88. <i>Not applicable</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	I1	
DEMOGRAPHICS					
D1	Gender	1. <i>Male</i> 2. <i>Female</i> 99. <i>NA</i>		D1	
D2	Refugee status	1. <i>Refugee</i> 2. <i>Non-refugee</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		D2	
D3	Age of respondent	/ / / years old 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		D3	
D4	Area of residence	1. <i>City</i> 2. <i>Village</i>	3. <i>Refugee camp</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	D4	
D5	Governorate	1. <i>Jenin</i> 2. <i>Toubas</i> 3. <i>Nablus</i> 4. <i>Salfit</i> 5. <i>Qalqilia</i> 6. <i>Tulkarem</i>	7. <i>Ramallah</i> 8. <i>Jerusalem</i> 9. <i>Jericho</i> 10. <i>Bethlehem</i> 11. <i>Hebron</i>	12. <i>North Gaza</i> 13. <i>Gaza city</i> 14. <i>Rafah</i> 15. <i>Deir al-Balah</i> 16. <i>Khan Younis</i>	D5
D6	Which political or religious faction do you trust most?	1. <i>Hamas</i> 2. <i>Fateh</i> 3. <i>PFLP</i>	4. <i>Jihad</i> 88. <i>Don't trust any</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>	D6	
D7	Would you consider joining a new party if its objectives are largely consistent with yours?	1. <i>Definitely yes</i> 2. <i>Probably yes</i> 3. <i>Definitely no</i>	4. <i>Probably no</i> 99. <i>DK/NA</i>		